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Preface  
  
Research based spin-­offs (RBSO) are new firms created to commercially exploit knowledge,                                   
technology or research results developed within an academic institution. The phenomenon of                                   
RBSOs has become an increasingly important way of transferring technology and knowledge                                   
from research institutions into commercial value. RBSOs are characterized by their academic                                   
origin and their technology is often based on generic research. These characteristics                                   
distinguish RBSOs from other start-­ups, and influence their development and behavior.                                
RBSOs consistently underperform compared to other spin-­offs and a better perception of how                                      
RBSOs act and evolve is important to understand why they underperform and how they can                                            
overcome  their  specific  challenges.  
Many researchers as well as our own entrepreneurial experience support that initial strategic                                      
decisions are important to future performance and survival. A popular way of describing how                                         
firms create, capture and deliver value is through the concept of business models. Hence,                                         
knowledge of what influences the choices that lead to a RBSO’s initial operational business                                         
model and how this may change over time will contribute to a better understanding of how                                               
they can improve their performance. With this in mind, part one of this master thesis seeks to                                                  
contribute to the knowledge of what drivers may lead to different choices regarding RBSOs’                                         
business model. This is done by an extensive literature study. The second part investigates                                         
financial capital as a driver, by tracking the development of 84 Norwegian RBSOs from                                         
2000-­2012.  This  is  presented  in  a  second  article.  
Article one is a literature review concerning drivers for choice of business models among                                         
RBSOs. Through a systematic literature search we have identified and analyzed the drivers                                      
that lead to the choice of specific types of business models. These drivers were categorized into                                               
three internal and three external categories. All drivers was analyzed according to their                                      
influence on activity based and growth oriented business model types respectively. How and                                      
why RBSOs choose to pursue certain types of activity based and growth oriented business                                         
models was found to be largely unexplored in the literature. We also found that financial                                            
capital, social capital, support from the parent institution and environmental factors are                                   
categories of enabling drivers, by providing the possibility for the RBSOs to choose any                                         
desirable business model. However, technology characteristics, market/industry conditions                       
and resources are categories of drivers that directly affect the choice of activity orientation of                                            
the business model. In addition, we suggest that drivers in the categories financial capital,                                         
human capital, technology characteristics, market conditions and founder’s mindset influence                             
the  choice  of  growth  orientation.  
  
  
     
Article two empirically investigates how financial capital affect the RBSOs’ choice of business                                      
model, as well as the impact of the change itself. Three hypotheses were investigated in a                                               
mixed method approach. Cases of all activity based business model change combinations were                                      
found in the sample of 84 RBSOs. Financial capital as a constrainer was found to be                                               
dominating. Unsatisfactory financial situation was in particular found to limit which model a                                      
firm may change to. In addition, we found that the likelihood of being discontinued was                                            
significantly lower for RBSO that had made a business model change compared to others.                                         
Further, financial situation was found to have a significant impact on occurrence of activity                                         
based business model change, measured over two consecutive years. Lastly, the act of                                      
changing business model was found to have a positive impact on firm survival. The                                         
framework of drivers for choice of business models proposed in article 1 has shown to be a                                                  
useful  tool  in  the  study  in  article  2.  
  
     
Summary  in  Norwegian  
  
Forskningsbaserte spinoff-­selskaper (RBSO) er nye bedrifter opprettet for å kommersialisere                             
kunnskap, teknologi eller forskningsresultater utviklet på en forskningsinstitusjon. Fenomenet                          
RBSOer har blitt en stadig viktigere måte å overføre teknologi og kunnskap fra                                      
forskningsinstitusjoner til kommersiell og samfunnsmessig verdi. RBSOer er preget av sin                                
akademiske opprinnelse og teknologien er ofte basert på grunnforskning. Disse egenskapene                                
skiller RBSOer fra andre oppstartsbedrifter, og påvirker deres utvikling og atferd. For å forstå                                         
hvorfor RBSOer i større grad mislykkes enn andre oppstartselskaper er det nødvendig å øke                                         
kunnskapen  om  hvordan  disse  selskapene  utvikler  seg,  og  hvordan  de  overvinner  utfordringer.    
Mange forskere, inkludert oss selv med vår egen gründererfaring, finner de første strategiske                                      
beslutningen som svært viktige for bedriftenes fremtid. Forretningsmodell er et populært                                
utrykk for hvordan bedrifter skaper, fanger og leverer verdier. På bakgrunn av dette mener vi                                            
at mer kunnskap om hva som påvirker hvilken forretningsmodellen RBSOer velger som den                                      
første, og hvordan den endres over tid vil øke forståelsen og bidra til at denne typen selskap                                                  
kan  prestere  bedre  i  fremtiden.    
Denne masteroppgaven består av to artikler. Første artikkel er en litteraturgjennomgang for å                                      
samle teoretiske bidrag vedrørende hva slags drivere som fører til bedriftenes spesifikke valg                                      
av forretningsmodell. Den andre artikkelen undersøker en av driverne, finansielle ressurser, og                                   
hvordan  den  har  påvirkert  84  norske  RBSOer  fra  2000-­2012.    
  
Artikkel 1 identifiserer og analyserer drivere som påvirker RBSOer og deres valg av                                      
forretningsmodell ved hjelp av en omfattende litteraturgjennomgang. De identifiserte driverne                             
ble kategorisert i tre interne og tre eksterne kategorier. Alle driverne ble analysert og deres                                            
påvirkningskraft på valg av aktivitetsbaserte og vekstbaserte forretninsmodeller ble                          
identifisert. Hvordan og hvorfor RBSOer velger sin respektive forretningsmodell viste seg å                                   
være et svært urørt forskningsfelt. Videre fant vi at finansielle ressurser, sosial kapital,                                      
påvirkning fra forskningsinstitusjonen og miljøet rundt RBSOer fungerer som en                             
mulighetskapende faktor som gir bedriftene flere valgmuligheter under valg av                             
forretningsmodell. Teknologiens karakteristikk, marked/industri, og ressurser direkte påvirker                       
hva slags aktivitetsbasert forretningsmodell selskapene velger. I tillegg fant vi ut at finansielle                                      
ressuser, menneskelige ressurser, teknologi karakteristikk, market/industri og                    
entreprenørenes tankesett direkte påvirker hva slags vekstbasert forretningsmodell RBSOene                          
velger.  
  
  
  
     
Artikkel 2 tester empirisk mengden av påvirkningkraft finansielle ressurser har på endringer                                   
av forretningsmodellen, og hva som er resultatet av at bedriften endrer forretningsmodellen.                                   
Tre hypoteser ble testet ved hjelp av en kombinert kvalitativ og kvantitativ metode. Alle                                         
kombinasjoner av endringer mellom aktivitets-­orienterte forretningsmodeller ble funnet i                          
utvalget av 84 norske RBSOer. Blant utvalget var finansiell situasjon den dominerende                                   
begrensende driver. Finansiell situasjon ble også oppdaget å ha en signifikant utløsende faktor                                      
når det kom til endring av aktivitetsbaserte forretningsmodeller, når to års perioder ble                                      
analysert av gangen. Til slutt ble det oppdaget at det å endre forretningsmodell har en positiv                                               
effekt  på  overlevelsesevnen  til  RBSOer.  
  
  
  
  
Drivers that a ect the choice of business model in research based
spin-o s (RBSOs)
Karen Juul Skarbø, Halvor Johannes Langho  and Fredrik Lindseth Bergflødt
June 5, 2014
Abstract
Research based spin-o s (RBSOs) are new firms created to commercially exploit knowledge,
technology or research results developed within a research institution. This has become an important
type of knowledge transfer that may stimulate innovation and impact of research to society. The
business model concept is a useful way of describing how value is created, captured and delivered,
and the first business model of a firm will set the path for future performance. Through a literature
search and review of relevant studies, we have identified and categorized drivers that a ect RBSOs
choice of initial business model by combining an activity based and growth oriented business model
typology. Our categorization includes the internal categories resources, technology characteristics and
founders mindset, and the external categories market and industry, parent institution and operational
conditions. This categorization have shown to be useful way of analyzing how and why RBSOs choose
their initial business model. In particular, lack of resources, developing push technology and low risk
preference was found in the literature to lead towards a low growth or transitional consultancy or
TM model. On the contrary, access to su cient resources is likely to enable RBSOs to choose a high
growth product model.
1 Introduction
Research based spin-o  companies are becom-
ing an increasingly common and important phe-
nomenon for the society of industrialized coun-
tries as well as for the institutions they stem from
(Wright, 2007; Shane, 2004; Mustar et al., 2006;
Pirnay et al., 2003). This may be due to the
changes in society that industrialized countries
have experienced. Globalization of markets and
technology, information technology and interna-
tional transportation systems are drivers that has
made it unattractive for many western countries
to maintain their manufacturing industry. Creat-
ing wealth from commercialization of research and
development may play an important role in facing
these changes.
Spin-o s from universities and research insti-
tutions are important means of transferring the
knowledge and technology from R&D to commer-
cial value in the society, albeit not the only one
(Helm et al., 2013). Other ways of transferring
knowledge and technology are by education, pub-
lishing, conferences, contract research, and licens-
ing (Rogers et al., 2001). However, spin-o s are
important contributors to technology transfer due
to a number of reasons. Where the market for the
scientific discovery is undetermined, yet to emerge
or non-existent, conventional methods of technol-
ogy transfer as licensing are di cult. Creating
a spin-o  is a viable alternative increasingly uti-
lized (Wright et al., 2004b). Further, Bray and
Lee (2000) asserts that spin-o s are more e ective
and may create ten times the income compared to
licensing for the parent institution. Spin-o s has
also been found to boost regional economic devel-
opment in terms of exports, employment, taxes
paid, R&D and innovation. (Wright et al., 2004b;
Heirman and Clarysse, 2004).
The Bayh-Dole Act (1980) was passed in USA
in 1980, but it took 23 years before the Nor-
wegian government adopted the same legislation
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that allow universities to commercialize research
results produced by its employees. Governmen-
tal funds (such as FORNY) were created as a
mean to increase the birth of research based com-
panies (Borlaug and STEP, 2009). For govern-
ments, this has appeared to o er a means whereby
public policy could have a direct and significant
impact on economic development. (Bower, 2003,
p. 97). The universities are now trying to unite
entrepreneurial mindset and the academic culture
together by establishing technology transfer o ces
(TTOs), science parks, pre-seed funds and moti-
vate the researchers to change their attitude to-
wards a more commercial opportunity thinking.
The increasing spin-o  activity and the growing
awareness of the importance of them has spurred
researchers to get more interested in and con-
duct more research on this phenomenon (Mustar
et al., 2006; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Pow-
ers and McDougall, 2005). RBSOs generally dif-
fer from new technology based firms (NTBFs) in
two ways; by their unique academic origin and by
their specific and novel technology or knowledge.
RBSOs arise in an academic environment where
the culture at the university have been shaped
over time, including mainly research and teaching,
and hence non-commercial mindset (Pirnay et al.,
2003). Novelty of the technology often combined
with little knowledge of potential markets is char-
acterized as push technology, and may cause dis-
turbance in the market (Roininen and Ylinenpa¨a¨,
2009). To understand the spin-o  process and
phenomenon, it is essential to understand the het-
erogeneity of these companies and their behavior.
How they act has implications for and influence
the technology transfer and wealth creation pro-
cess (Conceicao et al., 2012). In order to preserve
the impact of such companies in terms of economic
and technological development, it is important to
study the factors that enhance their development
(Criaco et al., 2013, p. 2).
1.1 Research question
Spin-o s stem from a di erent environment, with
other variables and conditions compared to other
new ventures. Their unique origin, initial configu-
ration and impact on society makes RBSOs inter-
esting and necessary to study. The scope of this
paper is to investigate why they make fundamen-
tal strategic choices to create, capture and delive
value, commonly regarded as the business model
of a firm (Gu¨nzel and Holm, 2013). According
to Clausen and Rasmussen (2012) it deserves fur-
ther research to understand what drives research
based spin-o s to adopt di erent business models.
Choice of business model should be taken through
awareness of the advantages and disadvantages of
a given resource and market conditions. A better
perception of how these choices are made could
hence be useful for spin-o s in the future.
Hence, this paper will deal with the following
research question:
What drivers a ect the choice of the
first operative business model for re-
search based spin-o s, and what type of
business model may the di erent drivers
lead to?
We define drivers as factors or causes that forces
or directs the company to follow or not follow a
distinctive type of business model.
Stinchcombe (1965) argued that the surround-
ings of the company during founding process in-
fluence the characteristics of the venture and may
be long lasting. Further, because of the limited
resource endowments the initial decisions to be
made are crucial for the company (Vohora et al.,
2004). Making the wrong decisions would result
in lost time and resources, which will slow down
the spin-o . The first adopted strategic choices
are not necessarily everlasting (Conceicao et al.,
2012), hence we will also discuss the dynamic as-
pect of the business model.
In the next section we will present relevant the-
ory to discuss our findings from the literature
search. This includes the resource based view
(RBV) and business model theory. From the busi-
ness model literature we will propose a typology of
business models further used in the analysis and
discussion. Next, common definitions and terms
used for spin-o s will conclude on the definition of
RBSOs. We will then present the method of our
thorough literature search on drivers for choice of
business models. As a tool for analysis, we will
propose a categorization for these drivers. This
categorization will further be used in the discus-
sion of the identified driversÕ e ect on business
model choices. Hence, we will discuss drivers sep-
arately in the three internal and three external
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categories. Thereafter, we conclude on our find-
ings and suggest implications for further research.
Lastly, we present potential limitations of our lit-
erature search and analysis.
2 Theory
2.1 Resource based view
There are generally two prevailing views of the
firm in the strategic management literature used
to conceptualize firms and evaluate their compet-
itive advantage. The resource based view explain
competitive advantage on the basis of the firmÕs
internal resources, while PorterÕs market based
view look at inter-firm relations. As a representa-
tive for the market based view, Porter (1985) has
been a pioneering figure in the field of business
strategy with theories on market forces and com-
petitive advantage. The industry analysis frame-
work developed by Porter view the firmÕs position
in the industry as sources of competitive advan-
tage. The theory takes an outside-in perspective
and place the source of a firmÕs competitive ad-
vantage in the market by looking at opportunities
and threats. The assumptions that firms within
an industry control the same resources, and that
those resources are highly mobile is underlying in
the industry analysis framework (Barney, 1991).
In contrary to the market based view, the re-
source based view (RBV) portrays an inside-out
analysis of the firm and is based on the assump-
tions of resource heterogeneity and that resources
are not perfectly mobile across firms (Barney,
1991; Peteraf, 1993). It thus rejects the assump-
tions about homogeneity and mobility (Conner,
1991). This means that di erent firms in the
same market do not have access to the same re-
sources and have di erent opportunities to ac-
quire strategic resources, and can give rise to last-
ing inter-firm performance di erences (Wernerfelt,
1984; Penrose, 1959). These assumptions are the
main di erence between RBV and the industry
analysis framework, but Wernerfelt (1984) label it
two sides of the same coin. It is worth noting that
the unit of analysis is the firm in RBV and the
industry in the industry analysis framework.
Many RBSOs have long time to market com-
pared to corporate spin-o s (Agarwal and Bayus,
2002; Lofsten and Lindelof, 2005). To analyze a
firm based on its position in an industry years
before it has any sales in the market makes less
sense than looking at its resources and how it can
build capabilities to gain competitive advantage.
Thus we look at a firmÕs internal resources to ex-
plain its characteristics which is also commonly
used among other similar research projects (Mus-
tar et al., 2006).
2.1.1 Resources
Resources have been defined as attributes of a
companyÕs physical, human and organizational
capital that enable a firm to conceive of and imple-
ment strategies to improve e ciency and e ective-
ness (Barney, 1991). They also involve tangible
and intangible assets which are tied semi perma-
nently to the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) and stocks
of available factors that are owned or controlled
by the firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993). Hence,
resources are fundamental in creation, growth and
expansion activities of a firm (Brush et al., 1997).
One critique of the RBV is that the definition
of resources is too inclusive (Priem and Butler,
2001). It may be useful to view resources and
capabilities as capacities that enable a firm’s ac-
tions (Hodgson, 2008 as in Kraaijenbrink et al.,
2010). Intangible resources can be di cult to ob-
serve, describe, and value while tangible resources
can be physical or monetary. Firm resources can
be classified into categories although there is no
consensus among researchers on how to classify
them (Brush et al., 1997). For the purpose of this
paper we will use the classification of Ireland et al.
(2003); financial, human and social capital.
Financial capital are tangible assets and in-
cludes the firms monetary resources that can be
used to acquire other resources, both tangible and
intangible, that can be important to the firm (Ire-
land et al., 2003). Thus it is an instrumental re-
source (Brush et al., 2001).
Human capital are intangible assets and are the
knowledge and skills of the firm’s entire workforce.
Some knowledge is tacit and will only reveal it-
self through its application (Grant, 1996). In-
crease in the firm’s total stock of knowledge can
be achieved through social interaction between ex-
plicit and tacit knowledge, and need to be viewed
in the form of human capital (Ireland et al., 2003;
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Brush et al., 2001). Human capital can also be en-
riched through the firm’s external social capital.
Social capital can help the firm to gain access to
and control resources outside of the firm through
its network of inter- and intra-firm relationships
(Ireland et al., 2003). In the context of RB-
SOs, social capital within business is mostly not
present at establishment of the firm and need to
be achieved.
The capacity of the organization to cooperate
and coordinate resources can be seen itself as
an intangible resource (Grant, 1991) and the act
of combining homogeneous and heterogeneous re-
sources is a resource (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001,
p. 772). This leads us to firm capabilities which
are defined as a special type of resource, an organi-
zationally embedded nontransferable firm-specific
resource whose purpose is to improve the produc-
tivity of the other resources possessed by the firm
(Makadok, 2001, p. 389). Unlike resources, capa-
bilities are di cult to separate into which belongs
to the firm and which belong to the entrepreneurs
(Ort´ın-A´ngel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2013), since
the firm has only contractual rights to its resources
not its capabilities. Capabilities can not be ac-
quired, are unique to every company dependent
on which type of business model adopted, and take
years to develop (Teece and Pisano, 1994). Mean-
ing that entrepreneurs that have cooperated prior
to establishment of a spin-o  already obtain some
capabilities, and will develop others faster than
entrepreneurs without (Brush et al., 2001).
In volatile markets, dynamic capabilities de-
fined as [...] the firmÕs ability to integrate, build,
and reconfigure internal and external competences
to address rapidly changing environments (Teece
et al., 1997, p. 516). They explain how certain
firms can stay competitive over time and are espe-
cially important to create new resource con gura-
tions and capabilities that can sustain competitive
advantage (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000).
2.2 Business models
The term business model is used extensively, par-
ticularly among practitioners (Baden-Fuller and
Morgan, 2010), but also by management schol-
ars (Zott et al., 2011). The business model con-
cept gained increased popularity with the rise of
the Internet and the new ways of doing business
that followed (Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002;
Hedman and Kalling, 2003; Amit and Zott, 2001).
Although the dot-com bubble burst at the begin-
ning of this millennium, the business model con-
cept still maintained a common used term, and
became a concept applied to businesses in general.
However, both scholars and practitioners use the
term to describe a wide range of business charac-
teristics (Zott et al., 2011).
One reason for this heterogeneity of definitions
used may be that researchers have tried to de-
fine business models from a broad range of per-
spectives, like e-business, radical innovation, and
strategy (Shafer et al., 2005). Regardless of the
di erent definitions and ways of using the term,
most researchers seem to recognize that business
models describe how a company creates, captures
and delivers value (Teece, 2010; Gu¨nzel and Holm,
2013).
One of the more comprehensive studies on this
topic is George and Bock (2011), who looked at
definitions in literature and examined the percep-
tions of business models by practitioners. Al-
though George and Bock (2011) did not present
a conceptual definition, they concluded that the
business model concept is based on the underly-
ing dimensions of resource, transactive and value
structure. In other words the resources that a firm
possess, what they buy, what they sell and what
value they create in addition to how all this oc-
curs.
Another definition worth to mention in the con-
text of RBSOs is the definition by Chesbrough and
Rosenbloom, 2002, p. 529: The business model is
the heuristic logic that connects technical potential
with realization of economic value. However, this
definition is based on research conducted on spin-
o s from Xerox Corporation’s R&D department,
which exclusively consists of technical business
ideas. Spin-o s from research institutions may
not be limited to technical ideas, hence a more
general definition should be more suitable. The
conceptual definition of the business model that
will be used in this setting of analyzing research
based spin-o s, is the aforementioned definition by
Teece (2010) and Gu¨nzel and Holm (2013): How
a company creates, captures and delivers value.
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Figure 1: The business model canvas, Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010).
2.2.1 Business model elements
In order to describe the business model of a com-
pany, a conceptual definition may be insu cient as
it only provides the overlying logic of the term. By
defining business models as a notion of di erent el-
ements, researchers have provided a tool for prac-
titioners for describing their business model (Os-
terwalder and Pigneur, 2010; Shafer et al., 2005).
The framework of Osterwalder and Pigneur (2010)
(The business model canvas) consists of nine ele-
ments, or building blocks (Figure 1). However, a
literature study by Shafer et al. (2005) identified
42 di erent components described by various re-
searchers as building blocks of a business model.
This illustrate the variety of perspectives and per-
ceptions of researchers defining business models.
As Shafer et al. (2005) describes it: [...] by peering
through di erent lenses, authors are seeing di er-
ent things.
The elements of the Business model canvas
include key resources and activities, which are
used to create and deliver value (Osterwalder and
Pigneur, 2010). This is comparable to resources
and capabilities as described in RBV. This close
connection to RBV is an important link as it
provides a basis for analyzing business models of
RBSOs through RBV. Another element of the
business model canvas that may be related to
RBV is key partners, that represents social cap-
ital through network as well as available human
capital. Customer relations, distribution chan-
nels and customer segments are also elements that
contribute to creating and delivering value. Cost
structure and revenue stream are the elements
that constitutes the value capture part of business
models. Shafer et al. (2005) adds strategic choices
as a component of a business model. However,
these strategic choices can be integrated in each
of the nine building blocks of the Business model
canvas. They lay the basis for what the building
blocks should entail as well as how they are orga-
nized and coordinated.
2.2.2 Typologies and taxonomies of busi-
ness models
There are several attempts on classifying busi-
nesses by describing their kind of business model,
e.g. by the freemium-model or the McDonalds-
model (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). These
are examples of taxonomies. In the entrepreneur-
ship literature on spin-o  companies, most de-
scriptions of business models are based on a typol-
ogy approach. Two common groups of typologies
used in the literature embracing spin-o s are ac-
tivity based and growth oriented business models
(Wright, 2007).
The typology approach to describe business
models can be related to the element approach
as representing a specific set of all or some of the
elements. Hence choosing a business model type
involves choosing a particular set and organization
of building blocks in the Business model canvas.
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Activity based business models
Stankiewicz (1994) and Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004) use an activity based typology for business
models. They proposed that RBSOs are mainly
consultants, mainly product oriented or mainly
technology asset oriented. The latter is basically
a company that develops technology that is sold
through licenses and partnerships. Druilhe and
Garnsey (2004) adds software as a fourth business
model type.
We will use the arguments of Stankiewicz (1994)
and Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) that a service
provider model is less relevant in terms of RBSOs.
They argue that the consultancy model is the most
frequently used way to deliver services to a cus-
tomer for RBSOs because of the knowledge trans-
fer nature of RBSOs. Similarly, software-based
business models as presented by Druilhe and Gar-
nsey (2004) will not be included in our typology, as
software based firms can have a product based or
consultancy model. We hence argue that software-
based business model is not a distinct activity and
that a software could be viewed as a product or as
a service. Thus, we will use consultancy and prod-
uct based as distinct activity based types, where
consultancy includes service models and software
is covered by both consultancy and product types.
Technology asset oriented type can be compared
to what Colombo and Piva (2012) and Conceicao
et al. (2012) address as a mode of market of tech-
nology (denoted TM). Companies in TM typically
have a generic or novel technology which is not
market ready. The technology needs to be further
developed towards a specific market application
to be sold through licensing, technology sales, al-
liances or joint ventures (Conceicao et al., 2012).
Using TM as a business model type hence includes
a broad range of technology asset oriented firms
and will therefore be used further in this article as
a distinct activity based business model type.
Growth oriented business models
The second group of studies distinguish RBSOs
business model based on their growth orientation.
Degroof (2002) explored the growth orientation of
42 belgian spin-o s and confirmed the three types
of growth modes previously proposed by Tiler
et al. (1993) (as in Wright, 2007): Slow growers,
fast growers and transitional growers. Slow grow-
ers are typically businesses with a few employees
and limited ambitions to grow. Firms with a high
growth model have high growth ambitions and is
configured for growing fast, typically in terms of
both revenue and employment growth. Transi-
tional growers are companies that typically start
with a low growth model and switch to a high
growth model later on. Consultancy firms, R&D
boutiques or niche players that later on turns into
high-growth product companies are common in
this group (Wright, 2007; Helm and Mauroner,
2011). The di erence with the low growers is that
the latter already have the ambition to grow at
start-up, but for a variety of reasons they postpone
exponential growth plans for a few years (Wright,
2007, p. 70). Transitional growers are by some au-
thors, as for instance Helm and Mauroner (2011)
and Clarysse et al. (2003), termed soft starters.
Growth oriented models are defined as the in-
put of a start-up process, as opposed to the out-
put. The di erence between input and output of
growth is described by (Roininen and Ylinenpa¨a¨,
2009, p. 515): The growth of a firm may be re-
garded as both an input and an output of a start-up
process: input in terms of what motives and ambi-
tions the founding entrepreneurs have for starting
the new company, output in terms of the factual
growth of the new venture. Hence, growth orien-
tation of the business model is determined by the
growth ambitions of the founders.
Dynamic view of business model types
Although Stankiewicz (1994) points out that his
proposed activity based typology is not necessar-
ily mutually exclusive and that firms can move
from one to the other, Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004) claims the typology of Stankiewicz (1994)
is static. Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) adopts a
dynamic perspective which allows for the way en-
trepreneurs adapt and modify their business ideas
as they gain experience (Druilhe and Garnsey,
2004, p. 271). In other words that a firm’s
business model can change over time as a result
of a changing resource base and development of
capabilities when gaining commercial experience.
There may be various reasons for why business
models change over time, for example as a re-
sponse to increased competition in the market, or
as exemplified for RBSOs by Druilhe and Garnsey,
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Table 1: Typology of business models used in this
study.
Typology Business model types
Activity oriented Consultancy
Market of technology
Product oriented
Growth oriented Slow grower
Transitional grower
Fast grower
2004, 281:
[...] although the scientists initially
aimed at licensing their early-stage tech-
nology, they eventually set up a devel-
opment company to move the technology
closer to market while redefining their
business model and examining various
options including production.
A dynamic view of the business model type of a
firm hence implies that the initial business model
type of a firm is not a final choice. Both the activ-
ity type and growth orientation can be altered as
the entrepreneurs gain experience during business
development. A definite example of the dynamics
of choice of business models would be the already
mentioned transitional growers.
2.2.3 Business model typology for analysis
To analyze drivers for the choice of business
model, a typology based view on business mod-
els will be used. As spin-o s simultaneously pur-
sue an activity based model and growth orienta-
tion, combining these perspectives covers a broad
range of business models that can be described.
Applying a dynamic view on business models in
addition will form theoretical basis for analyzing
how and why certain business models are adapted
by RBSOs.
The business model typology framework used in
this thesis is summarized in table 1.
2.3 Spin-o s
New ventures established to commercially exploit
academic research findings are often expressed
as spin-o s. There are almost as many dif-
ferent definitions of a research spin-o  as there
are researchers focusing on these firms (Pirnay
et al., 2003). Terms like research based start up
(RBSU) (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004), research
based spin-out (RBSO) (Mustar et al., 2006),
academic spin-out (ASO) (Druilhe and Garnsey,
2004), university spin-o  (USO) (Pirnay et al.,
2003), and many more describes more or less the
same phenomena but have slightly di erent def-
initions. There are also a variety of definitions
for the same expression, and sometimes no def-
inition at all. The literature describes the new
established firms in di erent levels: New technol-
ogy based firms (NTBFs), research based spin-o s
(RBSOs) and university spin-o s (USOs). This is
illustrated in figure 2.
New technology based firms (NTBF) represent
the upper level, i.e. covering a broad range of
companies. The variety of definitions of NTBFs
presented by Storey and Tether (1998) illustrates
how non-uniform the definitions are. A widely
used definition include firms with irregular large
expenses related to R&D, and often employ highly
educated technical personnel (Storey and Tether,
1998).
A subgroup of NTBFs are research based spin-
o s (RBSOs) (Clarysse and Moray, 2004), adding
that there are some exploited research result from
a parent organization.
Lastly, the third level comprise university spin-
o s (USO), adding the criteria that the parent
organization has to be a university. It is also
common to restrict the population by adding con-
straints for the founder and his/her relation to the
parent organization. Some scholars define USOs
as RBSOs, which contributes further to the al-
ready confusing spectrum of definitions. In ad-
dition, USOs are not necessarily understood as a
subgroup of RBSOs, as it can be more related to
other aspects at the university than research re-
sults.
The variety and overlap of definitions proba-
bly relates to the variety of topics and context
of research in academic entrepreneurship. A suit-
able and clear definition is fundamentally impor-
tant if research findings are able to be generalized
and used as foundation for further research. Con-
sequently, there are several attempts on gather-
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Figure 2: Levels of spin-o s.
ing previously used definitions, as in Pirnay et al.
(2003).
Both Pirnay et al. (2003) and Djokovic and
Souitaris (2008) are literature reviews, and Pir-
nay suggests a new definition based on earlier re-
search. Both also recognize the two dimensions
authors use to describe USOs: founders role and
technology transfer focus. Most of the definitions
include both the link to the university, and the
use of technology origin from the institution (ex.
McQueen and Wallmark, 1982; Smilor et al., 1990;
Rappert et al., 1999; Carayannis et al., 1998; Nico-
laou and Birley, 2003). Vohora et al. (2004) ad-
dress two major di erences and challenges with
USO vs. NTBF, namely the lack of commercial-
ization knowledge and di erent objectives between
key stakeholders (university vs. investor). There
may also be di erences between spin-o s originat-
ing from universities and private R&D centers as
universities mainly emphasize knowledge transfer
through education (Shane (2004)). Nevertheless,
both are heavily involved in research and has lim-
ited commercial focus, hence share many similar-
ities.
We also exclude corporate spin-o s, as they
normally commercialize technology emerged from
market needs (pull technology), and have other
purposes (Roininen and Ylinenpa¨a¨, 2009; Ras-
mussen et al., 2012). They also have di erent ini-
tial conditions at start up and benefit from parent
corporation reputation (Bathelt et al., 2010).
Another factor that should be covered by a
definition of spin-o s is the use of surrogate en-
trepreneurs, who are professional business devel-
opers hired for leading the spin-o  process. This
is especially useful in situations when the inven-
tor is not able to leave the parent organization
(Radosevich, 1995). In addition, the surrogate
entrepreneur usually adds higher commercialisa-
tion skills compared to academic entrepreneurs
(Franklin et al., 2001; Bower, 2003; Colombo and
Piva, 2012). Smilor et al. (1990) among others
present a definition that exclude all spin-o s where
the founders were not former employees of the par-
ent organization. This is not a suitable definition
for this paper as our main focus is the company
and not the entrepreneur.
2.3.1 RBSO definition
Pirnay et al. (2003) has made a definition that
is well formulated and based on earlier research.
We would like to combine it with the definition
of Clarysse et al., 2000, p. 546, as cited in Pir-
nay et al. (2003): Research based spin-o s are de-
fined as new companies set up by a host institute
(university, technical school, public/private R&D
department) to transfer and commercialize inven-
tions resulting from the R&D e orts of the depart-
ments (Pirnay et al., 2003, p. 357). As we wish to
include public research centers in our definition,
a definition as RBSO will be more suited than a
broader definition of USOs. Hence, we define a
research based spin-o  as:
New firms created to exploit commer-
cially some knowledge, technology or re-
search results developed within a research
institute (university, technical school,
public R&D department).
2.3.2 Stages in the life cycle of RBSOs
In order to analyze RBSOs at their initial stages, it
is important to address the development of these
firms. Few studies focus on the formation and
development of spin-o s (Djokovic and Souitaris,
2008). An exception is Vohora et al. (2004), which
is a highly cited paper in the field of spin-o s,
and we choose to use their framework to under-
stand the stages RBSOs go through. The compa-
nies need to overcome certain thresholds to move
from one phase to another, and Vohora et. al.
defines them as critical junctures which includes
di erent resources and capabilities that need to be
acquired.
The research phase describes the prior phase,
where the knowledge or technology is initiated.
This is often done by a scientist researching in
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a particular field. Moving to the next phase re-
quire crossing of the critical juncture opportunity
recognition. This involves a match between the
invention and an unfulfilled market need.
The opportunity framing phase is related to the
evaluation of the technology and the commercial
potential. In this phase analyses on suitable mar-
kets, potential customers, competition and mar-
ket potential are conducted. The result of this
phase should be to find the commercial opportu-
nity generating the highest return of investments.
The critical juncture for entering the next phase
requires entrepreneurial commitment.
The pre-organization phase is when strategic
plans are developed and implemented. Strategic
decisions are made regarding resources and capa-
bilities now and in the future. This includes what
resources and capabilities to acquire and develop,
and how to access them. This is the phase that we
expect the company to choose the first operative
business model. If being able to acquire the nec-
essary financial, human and social capital (cross
the threshold of credibility), the firm will be able
to move to the next phase.
The re-orienting phase present the stage when
the venture is ready to o er some kind of value to
the customer and generate returns. This phase re-
quires di erent skills and resources than the pre-
vious phases, and the challenge is to be able to
locate, acquire, integrate and reallocate the right
resources. If the entrepreneurs show the ability
to create value from the acquired and developed
resources and capabilities, they should be able to
cross the critical juncture of sustainable returns.
Sustainable returns phase is the final stage pro-
posed by Vohora et al. (2004). In this phase the
business is running well, and the technology or
knowledge is part of the value o er. The com-
pany is now in a transition from being small niche
player, to become a noticeable market actor. Nor-
mally it is during this phase that the company
move from the presence of its parent organization
to an incubator or a science park.
In this paper we will focus on the Pre-
organization phase and the transition to re-
orienting phase through the choices that are made
in this period. It is in these stages that the RBSO
need to decide how to create, capture and deliver
value to the customer, hence create an operational
business model. According to the definitions of
the stages, it is likely to believe that some compa-
nies need to adapt changes to their initial business
model as they proceed towards the Sustainable re-
turn phase.
3 Method
3.1 Method of systematic literature re-
view
The literature search was conducted in SCOPUS,
and then in ISI Web of knowledge as a quality
check, because these databases include the jour-
nals relevant to our search. We used search terms
connecting RBSOs and other academic spin-o 
terms with business model related terms. Because
of the heterogeneity of definitions for both spin-
o s and business model, a variety of terms was
used to ensure maximum coverage of relevant liter-
ature. Since the business model concept is closely
related to strategy and consists of elements that
can be discussed separately, terms such as strat-
egy, resources and capabilities was included. A list
of all the search words can be found in table 5 in
Appendix. Rasmussen et al. (2012) was used as in-
spiration both for RBSO related search terms and
methodologically as they conducted a very thor-
ough study in the same context of RBSOs as this
paper.
We conducted the search in Scopus with the
code string found in Appendix A.1.1. This re-
sulted in 2943 unique hits where most of the ar-
ticles stem from irrelevant fields like medicine. A
few of the abbreviations, like ASO, are also used in
medicine and other disciplines. In addition, com-
bined with common terms like ÒstrategyÓ or Òre-
sourcesÓ, the search resulted in many articles of
no interest. To narrow down and remove the arti-
cles from unrelated fields we restricted the search
to the most relevant and highly ranked journals
in academic entrepreneurship, as found by Ras-
mussen et al. (2012). The journals and code string
can be found in Appendix A.1.1. This resulted in
88 articles. The same search was conducted in
ISI Web of knowledge and resulted in no further
articles.
The 88 articles were sorted manually by going
through title, abstract and keywords. This screen-
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ing was based on the following criterias:
• Main focus on the firm level
• Cover business model terms or related topics
• Mainly focused on RBSOs (or related defini-
tions)
This manual screening process resulted in 39 ar-
ticles, which was read in full text and analyzed ac-
cording to our framework for dimensions of anal-
ysis, explained further in the next section.
3.2 Method of analysis
In order to assess how the literature covers the
choice of business model for spin-o s, the 39 arti-
cles chosen as relevant from the literature search
was analyzed through a framework with dimen-
sions of analysis. These dimensions were research
approach, context, direct/indirect description of
business model and drivers, business model defini-
tion/description and drivers for choice of business
model.
The first dimension, approach, is chosen to as-
sess to validity and generalizability of the drivers
through identifying whether the drivers are based
on quantitative research, qualitative research or
literature review. As a means of assessing how
generalizable the findings of the analyzed articles
are, as well as the relevance to RBSOs, the next
dimension is context. Since not all articles use
the term business model, an important part of
the analysis was to identify and compare how the
business model concept was described, either di-
rectly or indirectly, and how it was defined. Hence,
the dimensions direct/indirect description of busi-
ness model or drivers and business model defi-
nition/description are included. As the central
part of the analysis was to identify drivers for the
choice of business model, the last dimension was
to identify and collect Drivers for choice of busi-
ness model. The main reason for analyzing the
context and the definitions used is to assess the
generalizability of our findings. The dimensions
of analysis and the reasoning behind these dimen-
sions are described in table 2.
From the 39 articles, 12 articles were found
to describe directly or indirectly a link between
drivers and business models and forms the basis
for the analysis and discussion of this paper. A
detailed and comprehensive description of our ap-
proach and tables of the results can be found in
appendix A.
4 Analysis
4.1 Identified drivers for choice of busi-
ness model
By analyzing the 12 selected articles (see table 7
in the appendix) a number of drivers that poten-
tially will influence choices of business model was
found. Several of the articles proposed drivers for
choice of business model according to our defini-
tion without using the term business model. Con-
ceicao et al. (2012) was the only article found that
links drivers to a specific activity based business
model type.
Drivers found are presented in table 3. These
drivers were described in a variety of contexts, for
example in the case of Bower (2003) who explores
how business models are selected in the biotech-
nology industry. Some of the articles only briefly
mention some factors that may influence the busi-
ness model. One example is Zahra et al. (2007),
who focus on how corporate and university spin-
o s di er in performance, but also mentions that
initial resources and parent organization rules will
influence business model elements such as key re-
sources later on.
4.2 Categorization of drivers for choice
of business model
Our categorization of the drivers for choice of busi-
ness model found in our sample is summarized in
table 4.
In order to analyze the drivers for choice of
business model in relation to the business model
typology presented in section 2.2.2, the drivers
were categorized. The basis for this categoriza-
tion was to separate between internal and exter-
nal factors, based on the propositions of Porter
(1985) and Barney (1991) that firms are influ-
enced from the inside (RBV) and outside (mar-
ket based view). In terms of internal drivers, the
classification of resources into financial, human
and social capital (Ireland et al., 2003) fits sev-
eral of the drivers we identified. Financial and
human capital as drivers was found explicitly in
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Table 2: Dimensions of analysis of articles found relevant in the literature search.
Dimension of analysis Description/Reasoning Purpose
Approach (methodology) Research methodology used in the arti-
cle. Important for assessing validity of
our findings.
To assess validity of our findings.
Context Institutional, geographic, market spe-
cific, technology or firm specific context
in the article. The spin-o  term and
definition used is important factors
To assess the relevance to RBSOs in
general.
Direct/indirect descrip-
tion of business model
and/or drivers
Whether the article describes business
models and/or driver for choice of busi-
ness models directly or indirectly.
To assess how accurately the articles
describe business model, the busi-
ness model concept and drivers in
relation to our definition. Will af-
fect the accuracy of our findings.
business model defini-
tion/description
Which definition of business model the
author uses, either explicitly or implic-
itly through related terms. Also which
approach (elements or typology for in-
stance) or which type of typology per-
spective.
To compare the definition and typol-
ogy with ours as a measure of the re-
latedness to our research question.
Drivers for choice of busi-
ness model (or related
strategy)
The core of the analysis. Which drivers
the author describes as a ecting the
choice of business model or related
strategy concept.
Identify drivers that are directly or
indirectly mentioned as influencing
the choice of business model or busi-
ness model elements.
Clarysse et al. (2000) and Colombo and Grilli
(2005) and social capital was found as ”contacts”
in Druilhe and Garnsey (2004). Hence, the first
category is labeled Financial, human and social
capital. Drivers that were identified as internal
drivers but not defined as financial, human or so-
cial capital was ”The entrepreneur’s ideas and in-
tentions”, ”Perceived risk for founders”, ”Specific
technology” and ”Broadness of technology”. The
latter two drivers are both about the specific tech-
nology used by the firm to create value. Hence the
second internal category is defined as Technology
characteristics. The first two drivers are cognitive
factors such as ideas and perception. These can be
related to entrepreneurial mindset, which is a com-
mon topic in the research field of entrepreneur-
ship (Shane, 2004; Ireland et al., 2003). Since the
founders of the RBSOs are those that constitutes
the internal mindset, the third internal category is
defined as Mindset of founders. A starting point
for categorizing external factors is the outside-in
approach, based on Porter (1985), who emphasizes
the role of the market and industry forces in com-
petitive analysis. Hence, the market and industry
should be an important part of external forces,
and the first external subcategory is defined as
Market and industry. ÒWindow-of-opportunityÓ
and size of the domestic market was two of the
drivers identified in this category. A central influ-
encing factor on RBSOs is the parent institution
they stem from. The parent institution’s strong
impact on RBSOs are described by several central
authors in the academic entrepreneurship litera-
ture (Wright, 2007; Shane, 2004). Several of the
authors in our sample explicitly mention the par-
ent institution as a driver that influences the busi-
ness model or related concepts. Thus, the second
subcategory of external factors is Parent institu-
tion. External factors that are not from the mar-
ket/industry or the parent institution are explic-
itly mentioned by one of the papers in our sample,
Heirman and Clarysse (2004), as ”environmental
factors”. They argue that macro-economic factors
as well as socio-cultural community specific factors
influence the resource base of RBSOs. These fac-
tors can be seen as environmental conditions that
the RBSO operate in, hence we define the third
and last category of external factors as Operating
conditions.
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Table 3: Drivers for choice of business model.
Drivers Paper Context
Percieved risk for founders, investors Bower (2003) Biotech business model
Timing of project.
Change of markets and technology dur-
ing development.
Prior knowledge and experience of
founders.
Lack of resources and capabilities. Vohora et al. (2004) RBSO development
Window of opportunity.
The entrepreneursÕ ideas and inten-
tions.
Resource need. Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004)
Activity based typology of ASOs
Entrepreneurs relevant knowl-
edge/experience and contacts.
Human capital. Colombo and Grilli (2005) Growth of NTBFs
Technical, commercial and managerial
skills.
Colombo and Piva (2012) Academic NTBF performance
Environmental conditions. Heirman and Clarysse (2004) Activity based typology of RB-
SUs
The specific technology.
Career history and experience.
Financial resources.
Parent institute culture.
Initial resources. Zahra et al. (2007) Performance of CSOs and USOs
Parent organization rules.
Licencing possibilities. Kollmer and Dowling
(2004)
Licencing
Size of domestic market. Autio and Yli-Renko
(1998)
Growth of NTBFs
Broadness of technology. Clausen and Rasmussen
(2012)
Business model and innovative-
ness of RBSOs
Novelty of technology. Conceicao et al. (2012) Drivers for market for tech. busi-
ness model
Academic founders.
Perceptions on appropriability.
Patent protection.
Parent patens.
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Table 4: Categorization of drivers for choice of business model and some corresponding drivers from
table 3.
Internal categories External categories
Financial, human and social capital Market and industry
Examples: Examples:
Commercialization and management experi-
ence
Market evolvement
Technical and industry knowledge Window-of-opportunity
Network Size of domestic market
Financial resources E ectiveness of patents
Technology characteristics Institution
Examples: Examples:
Broadness of technology Parent institute culture
Novelty of technology Parent institute rules
Mindset of founders Operating conditions
Examples: Examples:
Risk willingness Environmental factors
Ideas and intentions
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5 Discussion
The categorization of the drivers will be used as
a basis for the discussion. To understand the un-
derlying logic of this choice the impact of each
category will be discussed separately.
5.1 Internal drivers
Financial capital
Several authors in our sample mention financial re-
sources through more general terms like resources
(Vohora et al., 2004), resource need (Druilhe and
Garnsey, 2004) or initial resources (Zahra et al.,
2007; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004). None of these
authors directly link financial resources to a spe-
cific business model type. A reason for this could
be that financial resources are instrumental by
having an indirect influence on the business model
through enabling acquisition of other resources
like physical assets and human resources.
To discuss how financial resources can influence
the business model of RBSOs on its own, we dis-
tinguish between su cient and insu cient finan-
cial capital. Su cient financial capital is likely to
enable the entrepreneur to choose the desired busi-
ness model from the start (Ireland et al., 2003). If
the entrepreneur have growth ambitions, su cient
financial capital will enable a high growth model.
Insu cient financial capital may force the
founders to start up as a consultancy service to fi-
nance the technical development and then switch
to a product based or TM oriented business model.
This transition typically occurs when the technol-
ogy is ready and the required funding is raised.
This is observed by several authors (Druilhe and
Garnsey, 2004; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004), and
represents a transitional growth model. This tran-
sitional orientation of some RBSOs reflects a dy-
namic process of choosing business model, that in
this case is driven by technical development results
and availability of financial capital. Hence, insuf-
ficient financial capital may lead to a transitional
growth model.
Summarized, financial capital drivers seem to
influence the choice of business model in the fol-
lowing ways:
• Su cient financial capital increases the RB-
SOs freedom of action to chose from the avail-
able business models.
• Insu cient financial capital narrows the free-
dom of action to choose from the available
business models and may lead towards a low
growth consultancy or TM oriented business
model.
Human capital
Human resources will impact the ability to con-
struct and combine resources (Brush et al., 2001).
In addition, the human capital of RBSOs are char-
acteristic in terms of having extensive technical,
but often a lack of commercialization and man-
agement experience (Colombo and Piva, 2012).
Nonetheless, Heirman and Clarysse (2004) and
Colombo and Piva (2012) propose that the combi-
nation of technical, managerial and industry spe-
cific commercialization experience a ects how and
what kind of resources are acquired, and hence
which business model to pursue.
Bower (2003) describes knowledge and experi-
ence as an important driver for choice of which
business model and market to pursue within the
biotech industry. Especially knowledge and ex-
perience in management and commercialization is
mentioned as crucial for the choice of initial strat-
egy. Another context where human capital is seen
as an important driver is in the growth orienta-
tion of RBSOs, as investigated by Colombo and
Grilli (2005). They propose that human capital
a ects the availability of venture capital and finan-
cial resources in general, and hence enables a high
growth model. They also emphasize that growth
abilities also depends on what kind of knowledge
the RBSO possesses. Particularly, managerial and
industry knowledge and experience was found to
have positive e ect on growth, while the e ect of
technical knowledge on growth was rather small.
Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) investigate how hu-
man capital a ects the business model in terms of
activity type. Di erent activity types requires dif-
ferent skill sets; previous experience with one or
more of the models may lead to choosing similar
types again because they have skill sets based on
these models. As a result, Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004) suggests a link between knowledge and a
consultancy model:
For scientists engaged in pre-
competitive research, the most suitable
opportunity may be to provide ”knowl-
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edge services” on a consultancy basis
to make use of the scarce knowledge
they have that is valuable to customers
(Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004, p. 271).
Conceicao et al. (2012) claims that if the
founders do not possess any industry experience
from the past, it is more likely that they pursue a
TM oriented business model. Hence establishing a
possible link between lack of industry experience
and the choice of a TM oriented business model.
As mentioned in section 2.1, human capital
changes dynamically with changes in the knowl-
edge base. As a result, how human capital act as
driver for choice of business model changes along
with the development of the RBSO.
A summary of the drivers described as human
capital will hence be:
• The presence of extensive human capital en-
ables RBSOs to pursue high growth business
models.
• Extensive technological knowledge and
marginally entrepreneurial experience in the
spin-o  team lead the founders to choose
consultancy as business model.
• Absence of industry experience in RBSOs di-
rects the founders to choose TM oriented
business model.
Social capital
Social capital is mentioned as an influencing factor
for choice of business model by Druilhe and Gar-
nsey (2004) and Vohora et al. (2004). Druilhe and
Garnsey (2004) describe social capital through
contacts, which they closely relate to relevant ex-
perience and knowledge and hence a ects business
model similarly as human capital. This is consis-
tent with RBV in viewing contacts as a source of
relevant knowledge and experience. Social net-
works may be an e ective source of both tacit
and explicit knowledge, hence give access to re-
sources that can lead to sustained competitive
advantage (as presented in section 2.1). Social
network should therefore be highly important for
companies evolved from a non-commercial envi-
ronment where information asymmetry between
industry/market and the academic surroundings
force the spin-o  to gain commercial knowledge.
Researchers that have built their career in the
academia will most likely have personal as well
as professional network in academia. This net-
work may not be particularly useful for busi-
ness development purposes because individuals in
academia probably lack relevant knowledge about
the market (as also noted by e.g. Zahra et al.,
2007). Hence they are less likely than other en-
trepreneurs to have a social relations to investors
that may provide financial and human capital.
Since founders of RBSOs mainly have academic
backgrounds they will have reduced access to tacit
and complex knowledge about the market. This
may be a reason why RBSOs sometimes pursue
low growth consultancy as their initial business
model, to build a commercially oriented network
that can be useful when shifting to a product-
based model later on. Hence, a network of mainly
non-commercial actors may be a driver for the
choice of a transitional growth model.
Social capital in the form of network can also
increase the likeliness of obtaining venture capital
(Shane and Cable, 2002). In that sense, a relevant
and large network may lead to financial capital,
which again may be an enabling factor for choice
of activity based and growth oriented model.
The following link to choice of business model
has been found:
• Social capital enable the RBSOs to choose the
business models available by the increased ac-
cess to both financial and human capital. If
the latter is not present, it could force the en-
trepreneurs to choose a TM oriented business
model.
• Lack of social capital may seem to lead to a
transitional growth model.
5.1.1 Technology characteristics
The RBSOs di erentiate from other new ventures
by more often being based on push technology.
This means that these companies need to allocate
both resources to develop the technology, and to
make the market ready (Roininen and Ylinenpa¨a¨,
2009). Hence, we expect technology characteris-
tics to a ect what kind of strategic opportunities
the spin-o s are able to chose from, which is sup-
ported by Pirnay et al. (2003). Even though Mus-
tar et al. (2006) claim that few studies have fo-
cused on technological characteristics, we found
some interesting links to business model choice.
15
Conceicao et al. (2012) claims that start-ups ex-
ploiting push technology are more likely to chose
TM oriented business models. Although they do
not state why, we suggest the high level of re-
sources required to teach the customer the new
technology may be a barrier. TM business mod-
els may then be adapted since the RBSOs of-
ten do not have easy access to that kind of ex-
perience or resources. In addition, Heirman and
Clarysse (2004) reports that RBSOs normally pos-
sess a patented technology, and this may influence
a spin-o  towards choosing a TM or product ori-
ented business model as there are few incentives
for starting a consultancy firm based on patents.
The choice between product and TM may depend
on whether the technology is close to market or
novel. Product based business models are often
chosen from those who possess close to market
technology (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004).
Heirman and Clarysse (2004) also claims that
broadness of technology attract venture capital
and more experienced managers. Broadness of
technology usually result in several market oppor-
tunities, hence attracts venture capitalists. Since
VC is often related to growth, there are reasons
to believe that broadness of technology leads the
founders towards choosing a high growth business
model.
If the technology stem from generic research, it
is more likely to be a push technology (Druilhe
and Garnsey, 2004). This means that the spin-
o  sometimes need more time in the opportunity
framing phase (section 2.3.2), and gain knowledge
and revenue through consultancy or contract re-
search (Mustar et al., 2006; Heirman and Clarysse,
2004). If the founders in addition have growth
ambitions for the future they would adapt a tran-
sitional business model.
RBSOs that commercialize knowledge and skills
that is not proprietary, tend to chose consul-
tancy as business model. They are most likely
to grow minimally or nothing at all (Heirman and
Clarysse, 2004). These statements argue that con-
sultancy correlate with low growth business model
in the context of RBSOs, but may not be gener-
alized since it depends on the founders ambitions
and goals.
Thus, the following directions of influence from
technology characteristics have been assessed:
• Highly innovative and novel technology seems
to direct the founders to choose TM ori-
ented business models. If the application
area of the novel technology seems indis-
tinct, the founders are more likely to commer-
cialize their knowledge through consultancy,
and later change to product business models
(transitional growth).
• RBSOs that exploit opportunities through
pull technology, seems to choose product
based business models.
• Platform technologies increase the RBSOs
window of opportunities, hence enable high
growth business models.
5.1.2 Mindset of founders
Both Vohora et al. (2004) and Bower (2003) sug-
gests that cognitive factors are important for
choice of business model. Vohora et al. (2004)
argues that the commitment of entrepreneurs is
a critical juncture to proceed from opportunity
phase to pre-organization phase, and plays a crit-
ical role in the initial business model creation.
They do not, however, specify how these ideas
and intentions a ects the choice of business model.
According to Shane (2004), some common moti-
vations for starting RBSOs are wealth, status and
a desire to bring the technology into practice.
Some entrepreneurs may be driven by the am-
bition of self employment, and may not desire any
growth at all. Autio and Yli-Renko (1998) con-
cludes from their survey of 392 NTBFs in Finland
that most of the firms did not have growth as a
key goal at all. Although intentions and motiva-
tion may be seen as an obvious influencing factors
on the choice of business model, there may be dif-
ferent intentions of starting a business for RBSOs
than for other start-ups. This di erence is empha-
sized by Criaco et al. (2013):
[...] academics often create USU
(university start-up) as a mean of con-
tinuing a line of research they are in-
terested in or as a lifestyle company
(Migliorini et al. 2010) targeted not at
maximizing returns for its shareholders
but at keeping their lead researcher sta-
tus at the parent university (Vohora et al.
2004; Siegel et al. 2007). (Criaco et al.,
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2013, p. 3)
Another cognitive factor mentioned in our sam-
ple is perceived risk by founders and investors,
mentioned by Bower (2003) in the context of how
biotechnology firms should choose business model
and which applications to pursue. The willingness
to take on a high risk may be associated with high
ambitions, which may cause the entrepreneur to
pursue business models with large potential finan-
cial upside, but also with a large potential down-
side. However, the perceived risk may lead to any
model based on the risk preference of the founder,
and perceived risk may be seen as an enabling
driver.
However, if the risk preference of the founder is
low, this may lead to a low growth consultancy
model, as consultancy is the activity based model
that is closest to research (Druilhe and Garnsey,
2004).
Perception of risk may also change while de-
veloping the firm and the technology as knowl-
edge about the market and the technology is ob-
tained and developed into capabilities. A proof-of-
concept prototype that confirms or exceeds the ex-
pectations of the entrepreneurs may reduce their
perceived risk. Hence the business model or ele-
ments of the business model might be changed as
a result of knowledge acquisition and development
of capabilities.
To summarize the founders mindset, the fol-
lowing direction of influence in terms of business
model choice is:
• Founders mindset and motivation greatly
influence the choice of business model.
More precisely low risk preference leads the
founders to choose low growth consultancy
business models.
5.2 External drivers
The focus of the following three sections will be on
the external driver categoriesmarket and industry,
institution and operational conditions.
5.2.1 Market and industry
Do RBSOs tend to choose business models accord-
ing to an industry standard? We found evidence
of this in our sample. The RBSO Genentech Inc.
founded in 1976 is considered to have founded the
biotechnology industry, and even before they had
proven the technology they announced their strat-
egy of becoming a fully-integrated human/animal
healthcare company who would make and mar-
ket therapeutics (Bower, 2003). According to our
framework, we can classify their business model as
high growth and product oriented. When Genen-
tech went public in 1980 they had become one
of the key influences in the environment of other
biotechnology companies (Bower, 2003, p. 101).
Their business model, referred to by Bower (2003)
as the Genentech model had created an acceptance
in the market and the spin-o s following them
benefited from this acceptance and chose the same
model. This is a clear example of RBSOs choosing
a business model according to an industry stan-
dard.
As the biotechnology industry matured, the
credibility of technical capability and the promise
of a cancer cure ahead was not enough and a new
model of the focused, specialist company emerged.
The new model was to o er outstanding exper-
tise in one step of the process. Startup strate-
gies have evolved to reflect this, and companies
now more commonly present themselves as spe-
cialist niche operations with a limited number of
problems to surmount in order to meet their objec-
tives, rather than would-be integrated pharmaceu-
tical companies (Bower, 2003, p. 102). This shows
that evolving markets change the industry stan-
dard over time, which again influence RBSOÕs
choice of business model.
Conceicao et al. (2012) claim that the en-
trepreneurs’ perceptions about the level of appro-
priability in an industry influence their choice of
business model.1 If the level of appropriability is
high, RBSOs are more inclined to operate in the
TM.
In their study of Finnish new technology based
firms, Autio and Yli-Renko (1998) indicates that
1The appropriability regime of an industry describes the
ease of imitation. Appropriability is a function both of the
ease of replication and the e cacy of intellectual property
rights as a barrier to imitation (Teece, 2000, p. 19). When
the technology is inherently di cult to replicate and the
IP system can e ectively provide legal barriers to imitation
the level of appropriability is high. Assets can be the source
of competitive advantage if there is a strong regime of ap-
propriability or the assets are non-tradable (Teece, 2000).
This aligns with the fundamental assumptions of RBV.
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the size of the domestic market can be too small
to make room for the growth usually associated
with going international. They also point out that
selling the company to a bigger company with ex-
isting international distribution channels can be
a more feasible way to scale up the business and
that a high potential for growth makes it more
likely for the company to be acquired by a larger
firm. Would this imply that the RBSOs with small
domestic markets either go for a low growth busi-
ness model to be able to survive comfortably in
the domestic market, or a high growth model to
attract potential buyers? The size of the domestic
market thus a ect the choice of growth oriented
business model. RBSOs can be forced to pursue
an international market already from the start as
a consequence of a too small domestic market.
Hence, drivers within market and industry that
have been discussed as a ecting choice of business
model can be summarized in the following way:
• A future window of opportunities in the mar-
ket seems to lead the founders to choose tran-
sitional growth business models.
• RBSOs that experience high level of appro-
priability are more inclined to choose a TM
oriented business model.
• Size of market restrict the growth of the RB-
SOs, meaning that small markets leads to low
growth business models and the opposite.
5.2.2 Parent institution
As mentioned in the introduction there is a signif-
icant di erence between other start-ups and RB-
SOs, namely the institutional origin of the latter.
The academic mindset and entrepreneurial culture
in the parent organizations are fluctuating or not
even present at all, hence expected to influence
RBSOs (Pirnay et al., 2003).
Clausen and Rasmussen (2012) states that TM
oriented business models have a broad impact
range on market, and consultancy contribute less
in transferring the technology widely. Since policy
makers empathize national economic growth, they
would arrange more for companies that choose
these kind of business models before others. The
parent institutions need their employees for do-
ing research, and may influence the founders to
choose business models closer to their operation.
If there is a TTO at the institution, they would fa-
vorize the high growth business models leading to
commercial success. This conflict of interests have
raised the need for surrogate entrepreneurs, who
are able to deal with the di erent stakeholders.
The parent institution ability to attract, adapt
and use surrogate entrepreneurs a ect the possi-
bilities for the spin-o s.
Further, we argue that parent institutions are
potential great enablers by providing RBSOs with
more choices through available resources and sup-
portive initiatives. Initiatives like forming highly
competent TTOs and create funds for pre-seed
capital may enable RBSOs to develop their tech-
nology into something attractable for investors
and venture capitalist. The parent institution may
also a ect the culture in a way that founders are
more motivated and are allowed leaves of absence.
If this is not present, we suggest that the insti-
tution may influence the founder to choose a TM
oriented business models, and in some cases low
growth business models. The question if the insti-
tution directly tend to influence towards one par-
ticular type of business model is still unanswered,
but opens up to a highly interesting topic for fur-
ther research. Nevertheless, from the above dis-
cussion we propose that:
• Parent institutions that are able to create a
supportive environment for the spin-o  in-
creases the RBSOÕs freedom of choosing the
business model desired by its entrepreneurs.
5.2.3 Operational conditions
External factors that are not from the mar-
ket/industry or the parent institution are only
mentioned by Heirman and Clarysse (2004). In
their study on how RBSOs di er they state
that [...] the availability of venture capital, a
strong entrepreneurial community and a massive
influx of government funding impact the firms’ ac-
cess to resources (Saxenian, 1994; Roberts, 1991;
Schoonhoven et al., 1990; Deeds et al., 1999)
(Heirman and Clarysse, 2004, p. 252). Hence
by enabling access to financial, human and social
capital, spin-o  companies have more alternatives
when choosing business model.
Policymakers and media influence the society,
and in the end what is socially accepted or not. If
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entrepreneurship is highly accepted and communi-
cated in a positive way, researchers will be inspired
to take the leap of commercializing their ideas.
However, whether the RBSO founder chooses a
consultancy, TM or product oriented business
model depends on the motivation and other pre-
viously mentioned drivers.
A influx of government funding will a ect the
business model choice similarly as described for fi-
nancial capital. Hence more high growth models
and TM or product based models will probably be
chosen. Since governmental funding in the end is
controlled by political agendas, it may not be a
neutral support. It is likely to believe that policy
makers favorize employment and tax income in-
creasing business models, as they contribute more
to national economic growth. If true, this implies
that it is harder to be granted governmental fund-
ing if pursuing a consultancy model, and especially
if its growth orientation is low.
Other operational conditions that may a ect
the choice of business model is the natural envi-
ronment, demographic, social structure and over-
all national and international economic structures
and conditions. These are used as control fac-
tors in the study of Heirman and Clarysse (2004),
hence their e ect on RBSOs are controlled for but
not investigated further.
Because of the enabling characteristics of
drivers from environmental factors, it is hard to
identify or establish any direct links to the choice
of business models. There is little doubt that en-
vironmental factors have an impact on RBSOs,
but this correlation, especially in terms of busi-
ness models, seems to be a somewhat unexplored
topic.
The following connections between drivers
within operational conditions and choice of busi-
ness models have been discussed:
• Environmental conditions may act as an en-
abler for growth orientation through finan-
cial government support and general en-
trepreneurial culture.
6 Conclusion and implications
6.1 Identification and categorization of
drivers
We have identified and categorized drivers that
may influence how RBSOs choose their initial
business model by using a typology of business
models based on activity type and growth orien-
tation. As activity type and growth orientation
are simultaneously pursued by RBSOs, this typol-
ogy combination has shown to cover a broad range
of business models studied in the literature.
Drivers for choice of business model proposed by
the literature as leading to specific activity types
(consultancy, product or TM) are found within
financial capital, technology characteristics, mar-
ket conditions and foundersÕ mindset. Lack of
financial, human and social capital, developing a
push technology and low risk preference is pro-
posed by the literature as drivers leading towards
a consultancy or TM business model. Similarly,
developing a pull technology, high risk preference
may lead towards a product model.
The growth orientation of the business model
(low, transition or high growth) is by the litera-
ture proposed to be directly a ected by financial
capital, human capital, technology characteristics,
market conditions and founder’s mindset. Lack
of commercialization and management experience,
and exploitation of push technology are proposed
by the literature to lead to transitional growth.
We anticipate that lack of social capital, and fu-
ture window of opportunity may lead to transi-
tional growth model, and that low risk preference
among founders may lead to low growth orienta-
tion.
However, several of the drivers, as su cient fi-
nancial, human and social capital, act as enabling
factors. These drivers enable the entrepreneurs
of RBSOs to choose their desired business model.
However, the choice may be a ected by other
drivers more directly towards a specific business
model type, both activity based and growth ori-
ented.
Our findings show that our proposed framework
of categories (figure 3) is a promising tool for an-
alyzing drivers of the choice of business model for
RBSOs. As the definitions for both RBSOs and
business models di er significantly in light of the
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variety of contexts and topics used in the litera-
ture, it has been useful to investigate the drivers
in separate categories.
Figure 3: Categorization of drivers for choice of
business model.
6.2 Change of business model
We have addressed drivers that influence the ini-
tial business model choice, but both Stankiewicz
(1994) and Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) discuss
how business models change over time. As men-
tioned earlier, resource base, capabilities, mar-
ket conditions and environment are in constant
change. RBSOs need to adapt to rapidly changing
conditions by reconfiguring its resource base and
its capabilities, explained with dynamic capabili-
ties in section 2.1. Business models describe how
resources are being used to create, capture and
deliver value. Hence, business models will also be
in constant change. As we showed in section 2.2,
business models can be viewed both as a set of
elements (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010) or as
a combination of an activity and growth oriented
typology. We suggest that it would be rational
to adopt a dynamic view of business models with
this typology. Every business model is unique in
its structure, hence a change in business model
would be the same as choice of a new business
model. In the context of research it is easier to
measure the business model as a static variable,
as a point measure in time. We propose that our
framework is useful also when investigating change
in business models over time.
6.3 Implications for RBSOs and policy
makers
Human capital seems to play a central role in
choosing business model. This may imply that
entrepreneurs of RBSOs should be aware of what
kind of knowledge and experience they possess,
and make sure they have a combination of com-
mercial industry experience, market knowledge
and technical knowledge.
Choosing or designing business model is a dy-
namic process. The determinants for which busi-
ness model to choose changes over time. Hence,
the design and redesign of business model should
be viewed as an indispensable learning process.
RBSOs are often supported by governmental
funds through TTOs or seed funds. Although not
directly investigated by the authors in our sample,
policy makers can probably influence the choice of
business model. If so, policy makers should then
influence the choice of business model to models
that maximizes value creation for society. This
can for example be to give incentives to start up
with a high growth model.
Lockett and Wright (2005) suggest that the
technology transfer o ces need to obtain the su -
cient amount of business development knowledge
and experience to support the spin-o s in their
development. We have already addressed the im-
portance for the founders to possess industry and
market experience (social capital). TTOs need
to provide su cient knowledge, experience and fi-
nancial resources so that the RBSOs are able to
attract investors and venture capitalists.
6.4 Implications for further research
In this study, the literature on drivers for RBSOs
choice of business model has revealed itself as a
largely unexplored territory. An explanation may
be the complex and dynamic nature of how and
why RBSOs choose specific business model types.
In our sample, Conceicao et al. (2012) is the only
article that directly investigates drivers that af-
fects RBSOs choice of business model, in this case
drivers that leads to a specific activity type. A
better understanding of the process that leads to a
choice between various activity based and growth
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based business models will be valuable for spin-o 
generation and academic entrepreneurship in gen-
eral, as also supported by Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004).
In addition, few authors in the entrepreneurship
literature on RBSOs use the term business model.
Instead, more general and traditional terms such
as strategy, resources and capabilities are often
used to describe how firms create, capture and de-
liver value or elements in this process. Consider-
ing the heterogeneity that exists in the definition
of RBSOs as well as the business model concept
in the entrepreneurship literature, this may be a
significant source of confusion and prevent viable
theory building. A literature review of how the
business model concept is defined and described
in relation to the various definitions and typolo-
gies of RBSOs would therefore be useful.
A frequently mentioned phenomenon in our
sample in this study is that a low growth con-
sultancy is often an initial business model be-
fore switching to a product based model later on
(Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Druilhe and Gar-
nsey, 2004) . This may have an e ect on value
creation for society because consultancy is a low
growth business model. We suggest that lack of
market knowledge, lack of financial resources, and
intentions such as self employment may be drivers
for this choice. An inductive longitudinal case
study would give valuable knowledge on this topic,
where the RBSOs should be studied over time to
expose the dynamic development of the company.
It would also be useful to view the drivers in rela-
tion to the stages the RBSOs are in to explore the
dynamic e ects, and we propose to use the stage
framework of Vohora et al. (2004).
Most drivers found in this study are dynamic:
their importance and impact change over time.
This supports a dynamic view on business models.
But the business model concept is often described
in a static way (Mustar et al., 2006). A longitudi-
nal study of how and why RBSOs change business
models over time may contribute to a better un-
derstanding on how the di erent drivers for choice
of business model change over time and how they
influence each other.
Some of the categories we have used for the
drivers in this paper seems to be particularly un-
explored. Although resources are frequently men-
tioned as a driver for choice of business model, so-
cial capital seems to be an underestimated factor.
According to RBV, social capital is an important
factor for obtaining financial and human capital
and should hence be an important driver for choice
of business models as well. Another category that
seems underestimated is operational conditions.
These factors are important in the field of strategic
management, but seems somewhat ignored in the
literature on RBSOs. We therefore suggests fur-
ther investigation on how social capital and oper-
ational conditions a ect RBSOs choice of business
model. Further, parent institution is addressed as
an enabling driver, and we have not found indi-
cations on whether it influence directly on one or
more types of business models. As indicated in
section 5.2.2, this would be a interesting topic of
research.
Finally, we have not investigated which busi-
ness models that are most favorable in terms of
performance. Which factors and drivers that lead
to the optimal business model for RBSOs may be
an interesting topic for further research. Another
highly interesting topic is the e ect of changes
from one business model to another. More specifi-
cally, a study of how these changes may a ect the
likelihood of failing may provide valuable knowl-
edge to RBSOs. Though knowledge on the e ect
of business model changes, these firms may be bet-
ter prepared to make the right strategic choices.
7 Limitations
Since we are only using literature as empirical ba-
sis for discussion, the method of literature search
is probably the greatest limitation. Because we
conducted a specific literature search with limita-
tions on journals proposed from Rasmussen et al.
(2012), there is a chance that we excluded research
that would be relevant to this paper, both in the
field of RBSOs and other contexts. We also used
the backward snowball e ect to find other rele-
vant literature through reference listings. It might
be an uncertain method, since the starting point
could be wrong (Jalali and Wohlin, 2012). Apart
from using business model, strategy, resources and
capabilities in the search term, there could be
other words relevant to business model. Hence
we may miss literature of interest. We have cho-
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sen not to include generic literature that describe
other startups like corporate spin-o s, possibly
imposing limitations on our discussion and con-
clusion. A more described weakness and strength
analysis of the method can be found in appendix
A.
The drivers identified in our sample are men-
tioned in a variety of contexts. Some articles are
focused on specific industries, geographical areas,
or technologies. In addition, as described in sec-
tion 2.3, the variety of spin-o  related terms in the
literature is large as well as the fact that many au-
thors put di erent meanings in similar terms. Our
perception of the relatedness to the general con-
text of RBSOs as we define it may be an important
source of error.
An important limitation of the findings in this
thesis is that several of the drivers found in liter-
ature to have a link to a specific business model
type is only found in one article. Hence the va-
lidity and generalizability of these drivers are con-
strained by the validity and generalizability of the
findings in the article they are proposed.
Even though literature related to RBSOs are
limited, strategic management literature repre-
sent huge topics of research. A more comprehen-
sive literature review on these fields may have re-
vealed theoretical contributions that would have
increased our ability of making anticipated links
between drivers and the choice of business model
types.
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A Method
A.1 Article search
Since our topic has already been exposed to many
years of research it is important to find and use
the prior literature. Most of the literature was
identified during our specific literature search, and
others were recognized through references in those
articles, commonly referred to as backward snow-
balling (Jalali and Wohlin, 2012). Research re-
views are helpful, but do not cover all literature.
Based on this it is necessary to search di erent
databases for relevant literature. We decided to
use both SCOPUS and ISI Web of knowledge to
ensure quality. Both databases include highly rel-
evant journals for our research question.
First we collected search terms, and then com-
bined them so that we would include the most rel-
evant expressions. Rasmussen et al. (2012) was an
inspiration in our work since the article describes
an extensive literature search method in the same
context of RBSOs as us. This makes it highly
relevant to look at for search terms and journals.
Our research question address topics that are not
extensively and often not explicitly covered in the
current literature. To cover literature that men-
tion drivers to choice of business model without
expressly using the term business model, we added
relevant search terms like resources, strategy, ca-
pabilities and configuration.
Table 5 shows a list of all words included in
the search in a more comprehensive way than the
complete code string.
A.1.1 The literature search
Our first iteration resulted in 2943 hits in SCO-
PUS.2 Medicine, Engineering and Agricultural
2The search gave 2943 hits in Scopus. The code string
used:
TITLE-ABS-KEY((RBSO* OR RBSU* OR NTBF* OR
USO* OR SBEF* OR ASO* OR ”research based spin*” OR
”science based spin*” OR ”academic entrepreneur*” OR
”faculty entrepreneur*” OR ”scientist entrepreneur*” OR
”science based entrepreneur*” OR ”university spin*” OR
”academic spin*” OR ”new technology based spin*” OR
”university start*” OR ”research based start*” OR”science
based start*” OR ”new technology based start*”) AND
(”initial configuration*” OR ”resource configuration*”
OR ”business model*” OR ”development capabilit*” OR
”start configuration*” OR capabilit* OR ”resource*” OR
Table 5: List over all words included in the search.
Origin Combined with
research based spin* initial configuration*
science based spin* resource configuration*
academic entrepreneur* business model*
faculty entrepreneur* development capabilit*
scientist entrepreneur* start configuration*
science based entrepreneur* capabilit*
university spin* resource*
academic spin* strateg*
new technology based spin*
university start*
research based start*
science based start*
new technology based start*
RBSU, RBSO, NTBF, USO,
SBEF, ASO
and Biological Sciences was the three subject ar-
eas with most hits, 1748 hits in total. Obviously
it was a requirement to narrow the search to find
the relevant articles.
Rasmussen et al. (2012) has made a comprehen-
sive search in the same field as this thesis. They
first made a wide search and came up with 919 ar-
ticles that was manually sorted. The resulting 127
articles’ references was examined, and a list of the
most cited journals was made. Since Rasmussen
et al. (2012) already had made such a thorough
method, we decided to use his list of journals in
our search. Djokovic and Souitaris (2008) is a lit-
erature review on spin-o s from academic institu-
tions that strengthen our decision. They sorted
their literature search according to journals, and
4 of the most cited journals are included in Ras-
mussen et al. (2012).
The next step was to restrict the search with
regards to journals. We based the selection
of journals on the ranking made by Rasmussen
et al. (2012), and added Long Range Planning
to the list due to the journal’s focus on busi-
”strateg*”))
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ness models, something Rasmussen et al. (2012)
did not consider. The second search was re-
stricted to the following journals: Long Range
Planning, Research Policy, Journal of Business
Venturing, Journal of Technology transfer, Tech-
novation, Management Science, Strategic Man-
agement journal, R & D Management, Indus-
trial and Corporate change, Small Business Eco-
nomics, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
Administrative Science Quarterly, American Eco-
nomic Review, Academy of Management Review,
Organization Science, Academy of Management
Journal.
Our second iteration was more refined than the
first, and applying the journal filter resulted in a
list of 88 articles in total, a reduction from 2943 ar-
ticles.3 The reason for such a dramatic decrease in
numbers is the amount of irrelevant subjects, like
medicine, that was included in the search without
journal filter.
As a quality control an identical search was con-
ducted in ISI Web of Knowledge. This did not add
any relevant articles to the result from SCOPUS.
As a second quality check a second journal fil-
ter was applied. The previously mentioned jour-
nals was removed from the search, and a list of
journals relevant to business model literature was
added: Long Range Planning, MIT Sloan Man-
agement Review, Strategy and Leadership, Thun-
derbird International Business Review, Academy
3Journal filter gave 77 hits in Scopus. The code string
used:
TITLE-ABS-KEY((RBSO* OR RBSU* OR NTBF* OR
USO* OR SBEF* OR ASO* OR ”research based spin*” OR
”science based spin*” OR ”academic entrepreneur*” OR
”faculty entrepreneur*” OR ”scientist entrepreneur*” OR
”science based entrepreneur*” OR ”university spin*” OR
”academic spin*” OR ”new technology based spin*” OR
”university start*” OR ”research based start*” OR”science
based start*” OR ”new technology based start*”) AND
(”initial configuration*” OR ”resource configuration*”
OR ”business model*” OR ”development capabilit*” OR
”start configuration*” OR capabilit* OR ”resource*” OR
”strateg*”)) AND EXACTSRCTITLE(”Long range plan-
ning” OR ”Research Policy” OR ”Journal of Business Ven-
turing” OR ”Journal of Technology transfer” OR ”techno-
vation” OR ”Management Science” OR ”strategic Manage-
ment journal” OR ”R & D Management” OR ”Industrial
and Corporate change” OR ”small Business Economics”
OR ”Entrepreneurship theory and practice” OR ”adminis-
trative science quarterly” OR ”american economic review”
OR ”academy of management review” OR ”organization
science” OR ”academy of management journal”)
of Management Executive, Harvard Business Re-
view, Business Horizons, Journal of Business Re-
search The list of journals was generated based
on readings from literature reviews and references
in articles found in the second search. This search
contributed only with one extra article from SCO-
PUS, which was not relevant, and no extra articles
was found in ISI Web of knowledge. By this it is
reasonable to believe that our second search was
good enough to build the theoretical foundation
of our topic of research.
The searches was conducted 22.10.2013.
A.1.2 Selection of relevant articles
All 88 articles was manually sorted by title, ab-
stract and keywords, resulting in 39 relevant ar-
ticles that is the basis for the literature review.
To find the relevant articles from the list of 88,
some criterias was established. In contradiction
to Rasmussen et al. (2012) we do not want to ex-
clude theory from before 1990. Our opinion is that
early phase research need to be included as well
as the latest, and otherwise we might exclude lit-
erature that is important for our field of research.
The articles that deal with our specific topic will
be selected by the following criterias:
1. Is the content relevant for research based
spin-o  phenomena (general analysis)?
2. Does the article discuss the company or the
environment?
3. Does the article deal with the choice of busi-
ness model, strategy or resources?
The articles selected for analysis through search
and screening are presented by reference and title
in table 6.
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Table 6: Articles selected for analysis through literature search and screening criterias.
Reference Title Relevance
Bathelt et al. (2010) A knowledge-based typology of university spin-o s in the
context of regional economic development
Not relevant
Wright (2012) Academic entrepreneurship, technology transfer and soci-
ety: where next?
Not relevant
De Coster and Butler
(2005)
Assessment of proposals for new technology ventures in the
UK: characteristics of university spin-o  companies
Not relevant
Goldfarb and Henrekson
(2003)
Bottom-up versus top-down policies towards the commer-
cialization of university intellectual property
Not relevant
Bower (2003) Business model fashion and the academic spinout firm. Relevant
Baglieri and Lorenzoni
(2012)
Closing the distance between academia and market: exper-
imentation and user entrepreneurial processes.
Not relevant
Mustar et al. (2006) Conceptualizing the heterogeneity of research-based spin-
o s: A multi-dimensional taxonomy.
Relevant
Vohora et al. (2004) Critical junctures in the development of university high-
tech spinout companies.
Relevant
Druilhe and Garnsey
(2004)
Do academic spin-outs di er and does it matter? Relevant
Wright et al. (2004a) Entrepreneurship and university technology transfer Not relevant
Colombo and Grilli (2005) Founders’ human capital and the growth of new technology-
based firms: A competence-based view
Relevant
Colombo and Piva (2012) Firms’ genetic characteristics and competence-enlarging
strategies: A comparison between academic and non-
academic high-tech start-ups
Relevant
Ganotakis (2012) Ganotakis, P. Founders’ human capital and the perfor-
mance of UK new technology based firms
Not relevant
Doutriaux (1987) Growth pattern of academic entrepreneurial firms Not relevant
Heirman and Clarysse
(2004)
How and why do research-based start-ups di er at found-
ing? A resource-based configurational perspective
Relevant
Jong (2006) How organizational structures in science shape spin-o 
firms: The biochemistry departments of Berkeley, Stanford,
and UCSF and the birth of the biotech industry
Not relevant
Colombo et al. (2006) In search of complementary assets: The determinants of
alliance formation of high-tech start-ups
Not relevant
Zahra et al. (2007) Knowledge conversion capability and the performance of
corporate and university spin-o s.
Relevant
Kollmer and Dowling
(2004)
Licensing as a commercialisation strategy for new
technology-based firms
Relevant
Leitch and Harrison
(2005)
Maximising the potential of university spin-outs: the de-
velopment of second-order commercialisation activities
Not relevant
Continued on next page
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Table 6 – continued from previous page
Reference Title Relevance
Autio and Yli-Renko
(1998)
New, technology-based firms in small open economies - An
analysis based on the Finnish experience
Relevant
Candi and Saemundsson
(2008)
Oil in water? Explaining di erences in aesthetic design
emphasis in new technology-based firms
Not relevant
Colombo and Grilli (2010) On growth drivers of high-tech start-ups: Exploring the
role of founders’ human capital and venture capital
Not relevant
Shane and Stuart (2002) Organizational endowments and the performance of univer-
sity start-ups
Not relevant
Clausen and Rasmussen
(2012)
Parallel business models and the innovativeness of research-
based spin-o  ventures
Relevant
Lofsten and Lindelof
(2005)
R&D networks and product innovation patterns - academic
and non-academic new technology-based firms on Science
Parks
Not relevant
Lockett andWright (2005) Resources, capabilities, risk capital and the creation of uni-
versity spin-out companies
Not relevant
Lindelof and Lofsten
(2003)
Science Park location and new technology-based firms in
Sweden - Implications for strategy and performance
Not relevant
Karlsson and Wigren
(2012)
Start-ups among university employees: the influence of le-
gitimacy, human capital and social capital
Not relevant
Conceicao et al. (2012) The commercialisation decisions of research-based spin-o :
Targeting the market for technologies
Relevant
Wright et al. (2004b) The formation of high-tech university spinouts: The role of
joint ventures and venture capital investors
Not relevant
Clarysse et al. (2011) The impact of entrepreneurial capacity, experience and or-
ganizational support on academic entrepreneurship
Not relevant
Criaco et al. (2013) ”To have and have not”: founders’ human capital and uni-
versity start-up survival
Not relevant
Ort´ın-A´ngel and Vendrell-
Herrero (2013)
University spin-o s vs. other NTBFs: Total factor produc-
tivity di erences at outset and evolution
Not relevant
Smilor et al. (1990) University spin-out companies: Technology start-ups from
UT-Austin
Not relevant
Powers and McDougall
(2005)
University start-up formation and technology licensing with
firms that go public: A resource-based view of academic
entrepreneurship
Not relevant
Dettwiler et al. (2006) Utility of location: A comparative survey between small
new technology-based firms located on and o  Science
Parks - Implications for facilities management
Not relevant
Lubik et al. (2013) Value creation from the innovation environment: partner-
ship strategies in university spin-outs R & D Management,
2013, 43, 136-150
Not relevant
Wood (2011) A process model of academic entrepreneurship Not relevant
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By reading and analyzing the 39 articles in full
text, 12 articles were found to be directly relevant
to our research question and selected to form the
sample that is the basis for the analysis section
and discussion in this thesis. These article was
selected based on the same criterias as when se-
lecting the 39 articles based on title, abstract and
keywords, as well as the criteria of directly or in-
directly identifying or contributing to identifying
drivers for choice of business model. An overview
of the 12 articles is given in table 7
A.2 Assessment of the methodology
A.2.1 Critical review
Our literature search is imprinted by the time
limit of the project. A more comprehensive search
would have been favorable, but have not been done
because the scarcity of time. Since we restricted
the search to a selection of journals, the method
might exclude other important research work in
the field. Hence the use of Rasmussen et al. (2012)
for choosing which journals to include represent a
limitation of the literature search.
In order to reduce the amount of search results
and to get more relevant results in terms of the
research question, the literature search is limited
to include literature on spin-o  companies. How-
ever, there is most probably literature on start-ups
in general that do not mention spin-o s explic-
itly, but still contain relevant findings for spin-o 
companies and our research question that is not
covered by our search.
The literature search in this study was con-
ducted in two databases, ISI and Scopus. These
databases are known as the most relevant
databases for literature on entrepreneurship and
business in general, but there are still other
databases that may include relevant material for
our study. Hence, a search in other databases may
improve the quality and completeness of the litera-
ture search. In addition, the literature search was
limited to the title, abstract and keywords of the
articles in the databases. By searching through
the full text of the articles instead, the search re-
sult may include more relevant articles.
Another potential weakness of the method in
this study is the use of search terms that are
business model related. The words used to de-
scribe concepts that are relevant for business mod-
els are strategy, resources and capabilities. These
are based on which words that are mostly used in
the literature we have read on business model as
well as our own perception of the concept. Hence
we may have missed some words that may give
more relevant hits.
A.2.2 Strengths
Although the use of the literature search method
of Rasmussen et al. (2012) was mentioned as a lim-
itation it is clearly also a strength. The compre-
hensive assessment of which journals that contains
the most cited articles on spin-o  companies is a
quality assurance of the journals that we choose
to focus on in our study. Another study that sup-
ports the use of specific search on the journals
found by Rasmussen et al. (2012) is Djokovic and
Souitaris (2008). In his review of 102 articles on
RBSOs he listed the journals with, according to
cited articles, in which the journals with the most
cited articles are included in our literature search.
Focusing on articles from the journals with the
most cited articles is in itself a quality assurance
for the literature that is analyzed in this study.
We consider these journals to receive the largest
amount of articles on the relevant topic. ISI and
Scopus is also a strength in terms of quality assur-
ance of the articles because the articles contained
in these databases are peer reviewed and hence
must meet a certain standard.
The framework itself takes form as a table with
the dimension as headers of each column. Each
article to be analyzed is placed in one row in the
table and the analysis of this article is conducted
according to the topic or dimension in each col-
umn. This table, with the analysis of the 12 arti-
cles forming our sample is presented in table 3.
The identified drivers for choice of business
model are presented in table 3 and categorized in
table 4 in section 4 and further discussed in section
5.
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Cause and e ect of business model transitions for research based
spin-o s (RBSOs)
Karen Juul Skarbø, Halvor Johannes Langho  and Fredrik Lindseth Bergflødt
June 5, 2014
Abstract
Research based spin-o s (RBSOs) have become an important way of transferring knowledge from
research to commercial applications. However, by being born in an academic environment they di er
in many ways from other new ventures. Without industry experience it may be di cult to survive
in rapidly changing markets. Hence, understanding how to adapt to these changes through changing
their business model will be important for policy makers as well as the entrepreneurs. In this study
we have conducted a longitudinal analysis of why RBSOs change their business model and how
changes in business model a ects the likelihood of failing. Our sample included 84 norwegian RBSOs
supported by the FORNY-programme. By using a mixed method approach, we found that financial
capital was a dominant driver for changes between di erent activity based business model types.
Unsatisfactory financial situation was in particular found to limit which model a firm may change
to. In addition, we found that the likelihood of being discontinued was significantly lower for RBSO
that had made a business model change compared to others. The framework for analyzing drivers
for choice of business models proposed by Skarbø et al. (2014) has shown to be a useful tool in this
study.
1 Introduction
Imagine you are a scientist at a university, con-
ducting generic research to bring the world one
small step further. By chance you recognize from
yesterday’s result that there is an indication of a
new semiconductive material, far easier to control
and produce. This could either be a huge oppor-
tunity to change the total semiconductor industry
with your findings, or a total failure resulting in
waste of e ort, resources and time.
Starting a new venture based on novel technol-
ogy or knowledge is not an easy task, especially
not for researchers, who often lack commercial
experience (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Colombo
and Piva, 2012). Answering questions such as how
to turn the technology into a profitable product
and what the customer need may demand both
network and industry experience (Shane and Ca-
ble, 2002; Bower, 2003). Still, these are some
of the questions research based spin-o s (RBSO)
have to deal with every day.
Transferring knowledge by starting new firms
has become an increasingly common and impor-
tant phenomenon as well as a topic of great in-
terest among researchers in strategic management
(Wright, 2007; Shane, 2004; Mustar et al., 2006;
Pirnay et al., 2003). While RBSOs contribute
to making new technology useful for society, oth-
ers question the e ectiveness of technology trans-
fer by the means of spin-o  companies (Lambert,
2003). Although only a few RBSOs contribute
to increased economic growth and wealth (Wright
et al., 2004), the risk of spending time and fi-
nancial resources in vain is worth the attempt ac-
cording to an increasing number of policymakers
and scholars (Wright, 2007). Norway adapted the
counter version of the Bayh-Dole Act in 2003 and
an increased focus on spin-o  generation and de-
velopment has followed. However, Norwegian RB-
SOs do not seem to perform satisfactory in terms
of growth compared to international cases (Bor-
1
laug and STEP, 2009). Being able to describe
how RBSOs make strategic choices in their early
years will be crucial for assessing how to maximize
the e ectiveness of technology transfer and wealth
creation.
Heirman and Clarysse (2004) states the impor-
tance of dynamic change of firms, since dynamic
processeses lead to value creation and growth.
Created value and growth are closely related to the
firms business model, as this describes how a com-
pany creates, captures and delivers value (Teece,
2010; Gu¨nzel and Holm, 2013). The concept of
business models has been used by practitioners for
years, but has until recently been disregarded by
academic researchers (Zott et al., 2011).
What kind of business model the companies
choose in their early years has an impact on
their future performance and how they survive in
an rapidly changing environment (Vohora et al.,
2004; Zott and Amit, 2007). Often business mod-
els are described in a static view, which will give a
picture of a company at one point in time, without
capturing changes and development. However, as
firms are dynamic in nature, their business model
will also be subject of dynamic changes (Mustar
et al., 2006).
The business model of a firm can also be viewed
as a choice made by the entrepreneurs or founding
team. Thus, in order to choose the most suitable
model, it is important to understand the under-
lying drivers for these choices. We define drivers
as factors or causes that forces or directs the com-
pany to follow or not follow a distinctive type of
business model. This paper builds on the litera-
ture review Skarbø et al. (2014), where internal
and external drivers influencing the choice and
change of business model were identified and cat-
egorized. The categorization of drivers was found
to be a useful framework for analyzing business
model choices. Hence, it is used in this paper to
empirically analyze how and why RBSOs change
their business model as well as the impact of these
changes.
Financial capital is an essential resource for RB-
SOs, and found to be a strong driver for choice of
business models (Skarbø et al., 2014). As a first
step to assess our findings, we wish to further an-
alyze how the financial capital a ects RBSOs in
terms of changing business model. In addition,
we wish to explore whether a change in business
model influences the likelihood of failing by dis-
continuation of the firm. Hence, our research ques-
tion is How does financial capital a ect a change
in business model and how does a change in busi-
ness model influence the likelihood of failing for
RBSOs?
Our sample consists of 84 RBSOs from a pop-
ulation of 475 Norwegian spin-o  companies, se-
lected through a thorough screening process. The
data on each firm is unique in the context of RB-
SOs as it includes year by year information for
each firm. This database is the foundation of our
thorough analysis of annual reports and related
media coverage of 100 firms. Hence, our research
on this data contributes to a better understand-
ing of how RBSOs develop over time. By tracking
changes of the companies over time we aim to pro-
vide unique contributions to this particular field of
research.
First, all relevant theoretical definitions for this
research will be presented. RBSOs will be defined
based on existing literature, and the two main per-
spectives of RBSOsÕ business model used in this
paper will be presented. These are the activity
based typology and the elements of the business
model. Further we will describe how the drivers
for choice of business model found in Skarbø et al.
(2014) relate to the mentioned activity types and
elements. Second, we will discuss theory and prior
research that will result in three proposed hy-
potheses relevant for our research question. Fur-
ther we will present the method used to sample
and collect data, and how we used the data to test
each hypothesis. The results from the hypothesis
testing will then be discussed and compared to
similar studies, one hypothesis at a time. Lastly,
conclusions, limitations, and further research will
summarize and assess the findings.
2 Theoretical background
Research on academic entrepreneurship has been
dominated by a high degree of heterogeneity both
in terms of definitions and context used by the
scholars (Pirnay et al., 2003). This prohibits the-
ory building and further development of this rela-
tively new field of research. Although definitions
of the term RBSO varies, several authors have
2
made considerable contributions for reviewing ear-
lier definitions as well as proposing a general def-
inition (Pirnay et al., 2003). Based on the work
of Pirnay et al. (2003) and Clarysse et al. (2000),
the definition of RBSOs in this paper is:
New firms created to exploit commer-
cially some knowledge, technology or re-
search results developed within a research
institute (university, technical school,
public R&D department).
For institutions and policy makers to maximize
the value creation of publicly funded research it
is important to understand how RBSOs transfer
their technology or knowledge to the marketplace
in products and services. This is described by the
concept of business models. The general defini-
tion of business model is recognized by scholars as
the heuristic logic in how a company creates, cap-
tures and delivers value (Gu¨nzel and Holm, 2013).
However, the business model concept can also be
viewed as a set of elements (Osterwalder et al.,
2004) and as activity based business model types
(Wright, 2007; Mustar et al., 2006).
Following the argumentations of Skarbø et al.
(2014), this paper will be based on three types
of activity based business models; product based,
consultancy and market of technology (TM).
Product based types represent firms that develop
and o ers a product to a market. In this paper
we define consultancy models as representing both
pure consulting firms and service providers, which
is also used by Druilhe and Garnsey (2004). Com-
panies with a TMmodel typically have a generic or
novel technology which is not market ready. The
Figure 1: The Business model canvas, Osterwalder
and Pigneur (2010).
technology needs to be further developed towards
a specific market application to be sold through
licensing, technology sales, alliances or joint ven-
tures (Conceicao et al., 2012).
Skarbø et al. (2014) also used growth oriented
typology of business models, which is divided into
low growers, high growers and transitional grow-
ers. The growth orientation is further defined
as the intended growth, rather than the actual
growth of the firm. Growth may be both in terms
of revenue and employees.
An activity change is referred to as a change
from one of the activity types to another. When
the companies have changed one or more of the
elements in the Business model canvas in figure 1
without changing the activity, we will use the term
element change. This will for example involve a
change in market segment or key partners in a way
that clearly alter how the firm creates, captures
and delivers value.
As firms can be viewed as bundles of resources
(Barney, 1991), business models can be seen as a
description of how the resources should be config-
ured. Hence, resource based view (RBV) is a valu-
able framework to identify and explain the char-
acteristics of RBSOs (Autio and Yli-Renko, 1998;
Brush et al., 2001; Heirman and Clarysse, 2004).
Capabilities are abilities, routines and skills to
manage and coordinate the resource base and can
itself be seen as an intangible resource (Grant,
1991). A firmÕs ability to reconfigure its capa-
bilities as a response to rapidly changing environ-
ments are called dynamic capabilities (Teece et al.,
1997). Because RBSOs often are based on novel
technology in an international market, dynamic
capabilities have become increasingly important
for sustained competitive advantage (Teece and
Pisano, 1994). In addition, every business model
require a unique set of resources and capabilities
(Zott and Amit, 2010), and a change of business
model would then require presence of dynamic ca-
pabilities. Accordingly, we argue that RBV is the
most adequate theoretical lens for this paper.
The importance of understanding the dynamics
of spin-o s is also stressed by Vohora et al. (2004).
They identified five steps in the life cycle of spin-
o s. Two of these are highly relevant for the firms
analyzed in this paper; the re-orienting phase and
sustainable returns phase. Between each of the
3
stages there are critical junctures that needs to be
overcome to move to the next stage. The RBSOs
enters the re-orientation phase when overcoming
the threshold of credibility, which involves forming
a founding team and acquiring initial resources.
The company is now o ering value to a customer
in order to generate returns. The critical junc-
ture for moving from re-orientation to sustainable
returns phase is the threshold of sustainability,
which leads the company to gain recurring rev-
enue. Although the phases represents new activ-
ities and resources, the process is not linear and
involves iteration back and forth between previous
phases. In order to analyze the behavior of RB-
SOs, the critical junctures and phases will be used
in this paper.
2.1 Drivers for choice of business model
By reviewing the literature on business models
and spin-o s, Skarbø et al. (2014) identified and
categorized drivers leading to or enabling the
choice of activity- or growth based business model
types. The categorization of drivers for choice of
business model types proposed by Skarbø et al.
(2014) included three internal and three external
categories of drivers and is presented in figure 2.
RBSOs with novel and advanced technology
generally have a long time to market (Lofsten and
Lindelof, 2005; Bower, 2003). To analyze a firm
based on its position in an industry years before
it has any sales in the market makes less sense
than looking at its resources and how it can build
capabilities to gain competitive advantage. There-
fore we will analyze the RBSOs from a resource
based view and thus look at the RBSOsÕ internal
drivers. Financial resources are instrumental in
the sense that they can be used to acquire other
resources the firm needs and play a crucial role
in the development of RBSOs (Brush et al., 2001;
Wright, 2007). Thus it is relevant and important
for all RBSOs. This is why financial drivers for
the choice of business models are the main driver
researched in this paper.
3 Hypotheses
In order to answer our research question, we will
propose three hypotheses. The first hypothesis
Figure 2: Categorization of drivers for choice of
business model.
will treat the di erent types of activity based busi-
ness model change and the associated drivers. In
hypothesis 2 we propose that changes in business
model are related to the financial situation of the
RBSO. In hypothesis 3 we argue that change in
business model can be used to overcome critical
junctures and thus have an impact on survival.
3.1 Transitions between activity types
A change in one activity based business model to
another can have six di erent combinations, as
there are three di erent activity types in the def-
inition we use. These combinations are:
• Consulting to product
• Consulting to TM
• TM to consulting
• TM to product
• Product to consulting
• Product to TM
One of these combinations, consulting to prod-
uct, Skarbø et al. (2014) identified as a phe-
nomenon called soft starters or transitional grow-
ers. Soft starters are RBSOs that start out with
a consulting model while developing their prod-
uct, both in order to gain experience and raise
funding (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Heirman and
Clarysse, 2004). They di er from low growers by
their ambition to grow at a later stage. This tran-
sition from a low growth consulting company to
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a potentially high growth product oriented com-
pany, is characterized by a change in activity
based business model.
Soft starters have gained attention in research
on RBSOs (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004; Druilhe
and Garnsey, 2004). Even though Stankiewicz
(1994) states that firms may alter between the dif-
ferent activity types, there has not been focus on
the other combinations of activity based business
model changes. In their study of RBSOs, Conce-
icao et al. (2012) questioned companies about the
source of their current and future revenue streams
and 45% of the firms anticipated a di erent main
source of revenue in the future. However, they do
not provide any further details or rationale for this
observation.
In Skarbø et al. (2014) it was found that finan-
cial capital may act both as an enabler and as a
direct driver for choice of business model. Insuf-
ficient financial capital tend to constrain the pos-
sible choices of business models for RBSOs, and
typically lead to the choice of lower growth ori-
ented models. In terms of activity based changes,
this should generally result in changing from prod-
uct to either consultancy or TM because product
development is resource demanding (Druilhe and
Garnsey, 2004). Product companies are also gen-
erally more capital intensive than TM and con-
sulting (Druilhe and Garnsey, 2004; Heirman and
Clarysse, 2004). Depending on the technology
foundation (type, maturity etc.), TM and consult-
ing can be more or less capital intensive than the
other. Hence, a change from consultancy to TM
could be caused by a financial driver both as en-
abler and constrainer, and vice versa for a TM
to consultancy change. A constrainer possibly
prohibits the choice of a desired business model
(Skarbø et al., 2014). Access to financial capi-
tal enables the firm to choose a more resource de-
manding business model if desired by the founders.
This implies that changes from TM to product
is also likely to occur. Hence we propose that
all types of activity transitions should be present
among RBSOs.
Hypothesis 1a: All combinations of
activity based business model change is
represented among RBSOs.
Figure 3: Transitions between activity based busi-
ness models, soft starters in grey£.
Furthermore, as financial capital can act both
as an enabler and constrainer for the choice and
change in business model, it plays a role in transi-
tions from a high growth to a low growth model as
well as the opposite (Skarbø et al., 2014). For RB-
SOs, the three activity types consultancy, prod-
uct and TM is generally regarded as having di er-
ent growth orientation. There are generally more
product oriented companies among high growth
RBSOs, while consultancy orientation typically
represents the low growth companies. Hence,
transitions from one activity type to another of-
ten involves a change in growth orientation, which
implies that financial capital should play a role in
all transitions between di erent types of activities.
Thus we propose that financial capital will be a
driver for all activity based transitions of business
model, either as an enabler or a constrainer.
Hypothesis 1b: We expect to find
financial drivers as a constrainer in
changes from product to TM or con-
sultancy, as an enabler from TM or
consultancy to product and both enabler
and constrainer between TM and consul-
tancy.
3.2 Financial situation as driver for
change in business model
An important element of the business model of a
firm is its key resources. As financial capital is
instrumental by being used to acquire other re-
sources, the business model and financial situa-
tion of an RBSO are highly related. Skarbø et al.
(2014) proposed that financial capital can act both
as an enabler and a direct driver for the choice of
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business model. Su cient financial capital will en-
able the entrepreneurs to choose the desired busi-
ness model (Wright, 2007), which may again be
determined by the ambitions of the founding team
or the industry standard for instance. On the
other hand, insu cient financial capital can direct
the founders to adapt changes in order to secure
funding, and through this prevent the company
from maximizing the growth potential available.
Accordingly, inadequate financial resources may
act as a constraint to which business model the
firm can adopt.
The importance of financial capital to cross
critical junctures in the development of RBSOs
is stressed by Vohora et al. (2004). Especially
in threshold of credibility, availability of finan-
cial capital plays central role, as it enables ac-
quirement of crucial resources: During this pre-
organization phase, a key imperative is raising
su cient financial resources (seed finance) with
which to acquire other necessary resources (Vo-
hora et al., 2004, p. 164).
Kirwan et al. (2006) presents a framework of the
needs for new technology based firms, and ampli-
fies the importance of financial capital in all devel-
opment phases. If not present, the companies will
experience certain constraints that eventually will
slow down the growth of the firms (Colombo and
Grilli, 2005). Financial resources enables acquire-
ment of other resources, it a ects the resource base
of any new venture (Brush et al., 2001; Ireland
et al., 2003). Financial capital can enable and at-
tract human capital that could transform into in-
tangible assets, which may contribute to sustain-
able competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).
Skarbø et al. (2014) found that financial capital
a ects the choice of the initial business model, and
we propose that this holds through the evolvement
of RBSOs. Thus, we propose that changes from
one business model to another will also be driven
by the financial situation of the firm.
H2: Changes in business model are
dependent on financial situation.
3.3 Business model change and e ect
on likelihood of failure
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are focused on drivers for
change of business model. Another highly rele-
vant topic is what the consequence of a change
in business model would be. According to Zott
and Amit (2007), the choice of a suitable business
model has a crucial impact on the performance
of new ventures. Every business model determine
the resource need and how they are combined and
used in a unique way to create, capture and de-
liver value (Zott et al., 2011). A change in business
model therefore results in a new combination of re-
sources and capabilities, and this change demands
e ort from the firm in the form of human and fi-
nancial resources. Another factor that may cause
the change to be resource demanding, is struc-
tural inertia. The latter can be explained as an
organizationÕs inability to enact internal change
in phase of significant external change (Gilbert,
2005). As a result, a change in business model
may increase the likelihood of the firm being dis-
continued, as proposed by Hannan and Freeman
(1984).
However, the ability to adapt to rapidly chang-
ing environments (e.g. market changes), and re-
structure the companies resources represents dy-
namic capabilities. A reorganization of resources
demanded by a change in business model may
also be a result of dynamic capabilities, which are
highly important for the performance of RBSOs
(Teece et al., 1997). Changes in business mod-
els can hence be a tool for overcoming the critical
juncture to enter the sustainable returns phase.
This is also proposed by (Vohora et al., 2004, p.
159): In arriving at this phase of development (the
sustainable returns phase), the USO will have ad-
dressed many of the early uncertainties via the res-
olution of its precise business model. In addition,
financial capital is one of the critical resources
in order to maintain the companies strategic en-
trepreneurial ability, and gives the necessary slack
to seek and exploit new opportunities.
New ventures that fail to reach the sustainable
returns phase will fail to generate su cient sales
revenue and will eventually have to be discontin-
ued or iterate to a previous phase. As the sustain-
able returns phase requires re-combination of re-
sources, changes in business model should increase
the likeliness of an RBSO to reach this phase and
survive. We argue that dynamic abilities serve the
companies to become successful stronger than the
negative e ect of resource requirements. Conse-
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quently, we propose that RBSOs that change their
business model are less likely to be discontinued
than RBSOs that do not undergo a change.
H3: RBSOs that change their busi-
ness model are less likely to be discontin-
ued than those who do not.
4 Data and methods
To get a better understanding of RBSOs we will
apply a mixed method approach when investigat-
ing the hypotheses, in this manner we will an-
swer questions from more than one perspective.
(Creswell et al., 2003, p. 212) has defined mixed
method as:
A mixed methods study involves the
collection or analysis of both quantitative
and qualitative data in a single study in
which the data are collected concurrently
or sequentially, are given a priority, and
involve the integration of the data at one
or more stages in the process of research.
The qualitative and quantitative results may be
divergent or contradictory and thus lay the foun-
dation for extraordinary reflection compared to
using either qualitative or quantitative data. A
qualitative review of all the companies was con-
ducted to collect data. When conducting the re-
views we noticed cases that made decisions where
financial constraints clearly was a driver. This fur-
ther strengthened our motivation to investigate fi-
nancial drivers for choice of business model and
the impact quantitatively.
Hypothesis 1 was analyzed qualitatively, while
hypothesis 2 and 3 were analyzed quantitatively,
and the interpretation of the data is brought to-
gether in the discussion. This way we can look
at both causal description and causal explana-
tion. The robustness of our quantitative analysis
is strengthened by the mixed method approach.
The knowledge we gained about the variables in
the qualitative review of the RBSOs is a strength
in the quantitative analysis. Our method is called
a concurrent triangulation strategy, where there
are two concurrent data collection phases and
where data is integrated during the interpretation
phase (Terrell, 2012). How we do this will be fur-
ther described in the following sections.
4.1 The context: RBSOs in Norway,
funded by the FORNY-programme
The FORNY-programme was established in 1995
to support commercialization of publicly funded
research in Norway. The general objective of
the programme is to increase wealth creation
in Norway through commercialization of research
based business ideas (Borlaug and STEP, 2009).
In the beginning, 1995-2003, FORNY was op-
erated through ”commercialization units” (CU)
at research institutions in Norway, targeting re-
searchers at universities, university colleges, re-
search institutes and university hospitals. Af-
ter new regulations in 2003 where universities
and university hospitals were entitled ownership
in ideas originating from research and ideas by
employees, Technology Transfer O ces (TTOs)
were established at the universities and a liated
with the FORNY-programme. These took over
the tasks of the CUs, and over a period of a few
year the CUs were phased out. There are cur-
rently seven TTOs a liated with the FORNY-
programme (Rasmussen et al., 2012). The TTOs
specialize in supporting researchers to go from
idea to business. Most of the TTOs in Norway
are jointly owned by the research institutions.
The FORNY-programme supports ideas from
all public funded research in Norway. As the
TTOs register all ideas from the research cen-
ters employees, the FORNY-programme enables
an overview of all RBSOs established in Norway
from the beginning of the programme. Those RB-
SOs that are established by students who commer-
cialize technology or knowledge developed without
involvement of employees are not included in the
FORNY-programme.
The FORNY-database of RBSOs is regarded as
a representation of the population of Norwegian
RBSOs. The database is not limited to certain
geographic areas in Norway nor an industry. The
firms in the database are typically high tech com-
panies within ICT, Medtech/health and energy
sectors (Borlaug and STEP, 2009).
The list of companies and the available data
about the companies in the FORNY-database is
unique in an international setting, as this amount
and type of data is not readily available in other
countries.
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4.2 Data collection
Our data collection is part of a comprehensive re-
search initiative at the Norwegian University of
Science and Technology (NTNU) and Bodø Busi-
ness School and is structured in three steps.
The database contains publicly available infor-
mation on all FORNY-supported firms. This in-
formation comprise of annual reports and media
coverage. In Norway, all private companies are
obliged to deliver an annual report including, but
not limited to, information on income statement,
balance, cash flow statement, the nature of busi-
ness, subsidiaries, R&D activities and going con-
cern assumption (Norwegian Accounting Act,  
3 ). Annual reports are made publicly available
after submission. In addition, information about
the RBSOs from media coverage was collected
through an extensive search in Retriever1, cover-
ing both print and online media. This information
was collected as a part of a previous evaluation of
FORNY, and made available to our research team.
First step was to select the sample and collect
and structure the data. The annual reports in
Norway from before 2000 are not yet digitized,
thus companies established before 2000 were not
included due to the limited access to the annual
reports. It is not uncommon for spin-o s to take
more than ten years before their growth rate be-
gins to accelerate (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006).
Hence, consistent data over a long period of time
is essential to study the development of business
model. This is why we chose to focus on compa-
nies established in 2000 to 2003, as they contain
more historical data. The 100 firms in our sample
were randomly selected within this timeframe to
ensure a representative sample of the total popula-
tion of 475 RBSOs, with controls from 2004-2012.
Table 1 shows the distribution of companies in the
population based on the year of establishment.
The database for analysis is based on an Mi-
crosoft O ce Excel template for organizing the
data of each firm. This template was developed
by the research group, in an iterative process.
To ensure consistency of the data regardless of
which team member extracted the data, an ini-
tial test was conducted. Three members of the
1Retriever is the largest news search engine for the
Nordic region, covering both print and online media. See
www.retriever-info.com.
team coded the same company, then the resulting
files of data was compared. The template is de-
signed for input information from the database of
the companiesÕ annual reports and media cover-
age. In addition, Brønnøysund Register Centers
web pages2 was used to gather information on es-
tablishment date, board changes, emissions and
changes in CEO.
The coding template consists of three parts.
One page with general information, a summary
of the qualitative data and any unexplained issues
and key variables. A second page with informa-
tion on the legal entity with dates and information
of important events. The third page is a thorough
year by year review of the annual reports with
information on R&D activity, customer sales, fi-
nancial status and change in activities/nature of
business. In addition, a complete list of up to the
ten largest owners were recorded every year. In
order to ensure that all changes in business mod-
els were identified and registered, the definition of
a business model change in the template was de-
fined as a change in nature of business. It is a legal
requirement to state among others the nature of
business in the annual report, and consequently a
change from one year to the next would be discov-
ered.
The team of qualified master students and PhD
candidates registered all relevant information in
the outline from the 100 companies founded be-
tween 2000-2012. Every outline was quality as-
sured by one of the PhD candidates in the research
team at NTNU. With our sample, this added up to
more than 900 annual reports coded by the team.
The Second step of our data collection was to
ensure that all companies in our sample were RB-
SOs by our definition. All the 100 cases were man-
ually reviewed to check if they complied with the
definition of RBSO presented in this paper. When
information was not available in the database,
TTOs or research centers were contacted to ver-
ify the origin of the companies. Eleven companies
were removed because they were either corporate
spin-o s or other new ventures that were outside
our RBSO definition. As a result, the sample size
was reduced from 100 to 89 companies.
In the third step, the initial activity based busi-
ness model of all firms in the sample was analyzed.
2www.brreg.no
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Table 1: Distribution of companies selected from 2000-2012
Established 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006-
2012
Coded 14 29 19 14 5 8 11
Not coded 11 6 12 9 14 27 180
Total companies 25 35 33 22 19 35 191
% coded 56% 83% 58% 64% 26% 23% 6%
We have interpreted the dominant activity based
business model element, from what the companies
report in their provided annual report. All firms
registered with ”yes” or ”unknown” on changes in
the variable nature of business was re-assessed to
conclude on whether a change in business model
had occurred or not. The definition of a busi-
ness model change we used was either a change
in activity type (consulting, product or TM) or a
change in one or more of the elements in the busi-
ness model canvas. The latter, an element change,
was further defined as a change in one or more el-
ements that indicates a clear change in how the
firm create, capture and deliver value.
For five of the companies assessed in step three
we were unable to come to a conclusion. As an
inconclusive measure of business model change
would represent a source of error when testing
the hypotheses, these firms were removed from the
sample. However, firms were not excluded if one
of their business model changes was concluded to
be valid. During the third step five more compa-
nies were removed and 84 RBSOs represent the
sample size used in this study.
4.3 Method of hypothesis tests
As the hypotheses was tested separately with dif-
ferent approaches, the method for each test will be
presented separately. H1a and H1b was assessed
by a qualitative approach and will be presented
first. H2 was tested with a chi-square test and H3
by binary logistic regression. These tests and the
variables used will be further explained in each
respective method presentation.
4.3.1 Method for investigating H1
To test hypotheses 1a and 1b, a qualitative ap-
proach was used because the number activity
based changes in the sample was relatively small
(16 activity transitions). In addition, the assess-
ment of whether a change was influenced by finan-
cial capital as an enabler or constrainer required a
qualitative examination of the firms. All RBSOs
with one or more changes in activity based busi-
ness model was used for testing hypothesis H1a
and H1b.
During the third step of the data collection, all
changes in business model was characterized as
an activity or element change. An activity change
represents a transition from one activity type to
another. As previously mentioned, these transi-
tions may have six di erent combinations: Con-
sulting to product, consulting to TM, TM to prod-
uct, TM to consulting, product to consulting or
product to TM. H1a was supported if all combi-
nation were present in our sample.
All activity changes were further analyzed to
assess the reason for changing activity, based on
the statements in the annual reports. The frame-
work of Skarbø et al. (2014) was used to describe
these influencing drivers for the transition. All
drivers described as financial capital, was then as-
sessed as either enabling or constraining. H1b was
supported if financial capital was represented as a
driver for change in activity type in all six com-
binations of activity transition as well as being
found as both enabler and constraining driver in
the overall sample.
4.3.2 Method of testing H2
To test H2, a quantitative approach was chosen to
enable a generalizable estimate for the population.
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Table 2: Variables used for test of H2.
Type Variable Attributes
Dependent vari-
able
business model
change event
yes = 1, no = 0
Independent
variable test 1
Satisfactory
financial status
1*
yes = 1, no = 0
Independent
variable test 2
Satisfactory
financial status
2**
yes = 1, no = 0
*Satisfactory financial status same year as change.
** Satisfactory financial status same year and year before change.
As H2 proposes that changes in business model are
dependent on financial situation, the null hypoth-
esis, H0, for testing H2 is business model changes
occur independent of financial situation. The sam-
ple for testing H2 was each year of operation re-
ported from all 84 RBSOs, which represents 755
years in total. A PearsonÕs chi-square test was
chosen for testing H0, as the relatively large sam-
ple size provides a good basis for accurate results
from a chi-square test.
Two separate tests for H2 were conducted by
testing each of the independent variables in table
2. This was done in order to compare the im-
pact of having su cient financial capital the same
year as the change in business model against suf-
ficient financial capital the year before as well as
the same year. The reason for this comparison lies
in the nature of the historical data on each firm.
In our sample, each year of the RBSO from estab-
lishment to 2012 or discontinuity was coded with
data on financial status and whether a change in
business model had occurred or not. However, the
e ect of financial situation will vary depending on
if the business model change occur early or late in
the fiscal year. To exemplify, a change of business
model early in the year may cause financial havoc,
which would be reported in the annual report. But
in that case it would be a result of the change
rather than the driver. In order to solve this is-
sue, we decided to perform two tests. The first test
compare each yearÕs financial situation against a
business model change or not. The second test
analyzed the financial situation in two-year peri-
ods and checked for business model change or not.
Thus we should be able to assess the e ect of fi-
nancial situation on business model change in a
process perspective.
Table 2 shows the variables used to test the
null hypothesis of H2. The dependent variable
business model change event represents a change
in business model one year in the sample, as de-
scribed above. The independent variable satisfac-
tory financial status 1 is the financial situation
the same year as the dependent variable is regis-
tered. Furthermore, the independent variable sat-
isfactory financial status 2 represents the financial
situation the year before as well as the same year
as business model change event. As shown in table
2, a value of 0 in each of the independent variables
represent insu cient financial capital. We defined
the latter as a lower equity than the share capital
or equity lost. This information was collected in
step three of the data collection, and is assessed
by analyzing the statement and balance sheet each
year from each of the RBSOs. A value of 1 for each
independent variable thus involve a larger equity
than share capital.
The test of independent variable 1 included 755
years. As the test of independent variable 2 in-
volved data from the year before business model
change was coded, this sample did not include the
first year of operation of the RBSOs. Hence the
sample size for test two included 671 years, re-
garded as events.
When a company contained a year of unknown
business model change, the year was treated as
”no” in the dependent variable. Accordingly, this
will lower the likelihood of an overrepresentation
of business model changes.
The chi-square tests were conducted through bi-
variate cross tabulation between business model
change event and the independent variables 1 and
2 respectively. P-values below 10 % were consid-
ered as significant dependency, resulting in rejec-
tion of H0. The cross tabulations are presented in
table 8 and 9 in section 5.3.
4.3.3 Method of testing H3
Binary logistic regression was used to test hypoth-
esis 3. This was chosen as the dependent variable
Business model change is binary, and because of
the possibility to control for other variables. H3
proposes that RBSOs that change their business
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Table 3: Variables used in test of H3
Type Variable Attributes
Dependent vari-
able
Discontinued yes = 1, no = 0
Independent
variable
business model
change
yes = 1,
no/unknown
= 0
Control variable Age Number of
years
Control variable Software yes = 1, no = 0
Control variable Biotech yes = 1, no = 0
model are less likely to be discontinued than those
who do not. Hence the null hypothesis, H0, for
testing H3 is that the discontinuation of RBSOs
is independent of change in business model. The
sample for testing includes all 84 companies in the
sample. The variables used in the regression is
presented in table 3.
Discontinued is the dependent binary variable
assigned 1 if the legal entity of the company have
been discontinued because of other reasons than
acquisition, and 0 if the company was still oper-
ating in 2012 or have been acquired. The reason
for rating acquired firms as not discontinued is be-
cause being acquired is commonly regarded as a
success. Hence the variable discontinued can be
interpreted as a measure of failure. This is consis-
tent with the definition of failure in several stud-
ies related to RBSOs (Criaco et al., 2013; Cressy,
2006)
The independent binary variable business model
change is assigned 1 if a company have reported
one or more business model changes in elements or
activity type, and 0 if not. Business model change
is tested against Discontinued and H0 is rejected
within a 10% significance level.
The control variables used to test H3 are Age,
Software and Biotech. Age is defined as the num-
ber of years the legal entity of the RBSO has ex-
isted from its year of establishment until 2012.
Higher Age of the RBSOs is expected to increase
the likelihood of business model change because
the company then may have overcome more phases
and critical junctures, which each require a change
in resource and capability base (Vohora et al.,
2004). In addition, for new ventures, the chances
of failure first increases steeply and then descend
gradually to reach a small long run failure rate.
This may be explained by the impoverishment of
initial financial resources because of unsuccessful
market strategies and subsequently increased hu-
man capital (Cressy, 2006).
RBSOs being based on software or biotech may
di er largely from each other in several ways. In
the variable biotech, both biotechnology and phar-
maceutical RBSOs are included. These firms dif-
fer from other new ventures because of the large
potential returns, but at the same time high risk
caused by scepticism, ethical issues and resource
demanding development (Bower, 2003). Because
of the large requirement for testing and verifi-
cation, these companies need more time and re-
sources to commercialize technology than other
RBSOs (Mustar et al., 2006). Software, on the
other hand, represent RBSOs that Druilhe and
Garnsey (2004) identify as generally less resource
demanding companies to develop. They may also
di er from each other in terms of likelihood of
changing business model or being discontinued,
hence should be controlled for in the test of H3.
To assess the robustness of the logistic regres-
sion we tested for multicollinearity by analyz-
ing the correlations and variation inflation factors
(VIF) between all variables. An upper threshold
of the VIF score is commonly accepted as 10 (Fre-
und et al., 2006). Similarly, the upper limit for
acceptable correlation coe cients is 0.8 in abso-
lute value (Field, 2009). The correlation matrix is
presented in table 11 in section 5.4. In addition,
the fit between the observed data of the variables
in the regression was assessed by observing the
pseudo R2 values Cox & Snell R2 and Nagelkerke
R2. An increase in these values when introduc-
ing the control variables confirms that the control
variables contributes to a better fit of the resulting
regression model.
5 Results and discussion
In this section we will first present descriptive
statistics for our sample with comparisons to sim-
ilar studies. Then the results from testing the
hypotheses will be presented and discussed sep-
arately. Lastly, the results of all hypothesis test is
summarized in table 13.
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5.1 Descriptive statistics
The sample consist of a variety of di erent compa-
nies, both in industry and lifespan. Figure 4 show
that the sample includes a broad specter of busi-
ness areas but medtech/health and ICT represent
the most frequent industry. The spin-o s originate
mainly from the research environment from the re-
gion around Trondheim and Oslo, and some from
other areas like Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen
and Tromsø.
Figure 4: Industry distribution of the sample.
Compared to similar research projects like
Colombo and Piva (2012), Smilor et al. (1990),
Clarysse et al. (2000), and Conceicao et al. (2012)
our sample di ers. Most of the latter articles
concerning European companies report high fre-
quency of biotech, medtech and software. What
distinguishes Norwegian spin-o s in industry fo-
cus is the share of maritime/aquaculture and mar-
itime o shore/O&G. Aquaculture in the terms of
salmon breeding and maritime industry related
to the Norwegian commitment in the shipping
and oil and gas industry. Aerospace industry is
not present in our sample, and di ers from some
other countries in Europe such as Italy (Colombo
and Piva, 2012). The di erence in distribution
could be due to various reasons. As most of
the researchers use di erent definitions of RB-
SOs, di erent types of parent institutions are in-
cluded/excluded. What kind of core knowledge
the parent institution possess and their direction
of research will a ect the technology/knowledge
RBSOs exploit. Also, the industrial configuration
established around the research environment as
well as the national industry structure influences
the particular need for research and innovative so-
lutions.
Figure 5: Distribution of years of operation.
Figure 6: Historical data of the sample.
Figure 5 show the distribution of the companies
in terms of how many years they have operated.
About 32% of the companies in our sample has
11-12 years of operation, and only a few lived for
1-4 years. According to figure 6, about 72% of the
sample contain at least 8 years of historical data.
This illustrate that our sample includes extensive
data from the first 8 years of the companiesÕ life-
cycle. 24% of the companies failed and were dis-
continued. 13% of the companies were acquired by
another company and 5% where merged with an-
other company with an unknown endstate. This
means that a quarter of the sample has already
discontinued their company, and about half of the
sample is still in operation. On average the com-
panies have existed for 9.3 years with a median of
10 years.
Similar studies to ours, as Clausen and Ras-
mussen (2012) and Heirman and Clarysse (2004)
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include firms with lower age, 2-7 years and 5-12
years (average of 7 years) respectively. As the av-
erage age in our sample is 9.3 years, we regard our
sample as providing enough historical data for en-
abling considerable contributions.
5.1.1 Initial business model characteris-
tics
Table 4: Initial business models within our sample
Initial business model Propotion of sample
Consultancy/Service 15.5%
Product 71.4%
TM 4.8%
Unknown 8.3%
Table 4 shows that 71.4% of the companies in the
sample chose product orientation as initial busi-
ness model. As a comparison, Helm and Mauroner
(2011) had only 40% product oriented business
models in their sample of non academic RBSOs.
Academic spin-o s are known to be more prod-
uct oriented than non academic spin-o s (Roini-
nen and Ylinenpa¨a¨, 2009), which can explain why
there are di erences between the studies. 4.8%
of our sample started with TM as their initial
business model, and 15.5% with consultancy. In
comparison, Helm and Mauroner (2011) identified
24% of their sample as pursuing a service busi-
ness model, in which they include both consul-
tancy and TM.
A possible explanation for the low frequency of
TM may be because some of the other firms re-
port that they are are developing a product or
being consultants although they in reality pursue
a combination of TM model. Clausen and Ras-
mussen (2012) report that half their sample in a
high extent followed more than one business model
at the same time. Clausen and Rasmussen (2012)
define parallel business model as companies pur-
suing several opportunities at the same time. An-
other explanation may be that the similar studies
look at the firms through a single point in time,
where some firms may already have changed from
a product to TM model.
5.2 Expected activity based business
model change (H1)
In this section we will investigate the hypothe-
ses H1a and H1b. The first test, H1a, will be
based on a categorization of the activity based
business model changes to check if all combina-
tions are represented. Further, the investigation
of H1b is a comprehensive review of all the RB-
SOs that has one or more changes in activity based
business model to find the potential drivers. A
discussion will follow the results before hypothesis
two is treated.
5.2.1 Representation of activity transi-
tions
H1a: All combinations of activity based business
model change is represented among RBSOs.
Table 5 display the initial business models
of the RBSOs, and the number of activity based
business model changes. Four companies change
their activity twice, thus 14.3% of the companies
have a change in activity based model. 7 of 16
activity changes were from product to TM, and
distinguishes from the other. Our results indicate
that the most common change in our population
is from product to either consultancy or TM. All
combinations of activity based business model
change is represented among the RBSOs in our
sample. Hence, hypothesis 1a is supported.
As all combinations of activity transitions was
found, this may confirm our assumption that the
changes are made from a low to high growth ori-
entation or vice versa. This may further support
our proposed link between financial capital and
activity based changes in business model.
5.2.2 Activity based transition represen-
tation
Hypothesis 1b: We expect to find financial drivers
as a constrainer in changes from product to
TM or consultancy, as an enabler from TM
or consultancy to product and both enabler and
constrainer between TM and consultancy.
To find the drivers for the changes, every
company was reviewed in detail. A summary
of the result is displayed in table 6. The table
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Table 5: Initial business model and overview of total activity changes
Initial busi-
ness model
Number of
companies
Activity change of business
model
Number of
changes
Consultancy 13 Consultancy to TM 2
Consultancy to product 1
Product 60 Product to TM 7
Product to consultancy 4
TM 4 TM to product 1
TM to consultancy 1
Unknown 7
Total 84 Total 16
show a firm by firm overview. Financial drivers
were found as a constrainer in all activity based
transition types except for the soft starter where
it was found as an enabler. However, as financial
resources acted as a constrainer in the one
company that changed from TM to product
orientation hypothesis 1b cannot be supported.
The results are still interesting, as financial
drivers was found in 13 out of 16 changes. In the
following discussion we will go through all the
activity based change combinations.
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Table 6: Review of activity based business model changes and corresponding drivers.
RBSO Change Description Driver 2nd
change
Description 2nd
driver
Synthetica
AS
Consultancy
to prod-
uct
Start production
of unique vitamin
standards
Good finances
and market
opportunity,
enabler
New In-
dex AS
Product
to consul-
tancy
Acquired, changed to
contract research for
parent company.
Acquired
Isocare
AS
Product
to consul-
tancy
States that con-
sultancy will give
financial room for
development.
Poor finances,
constraint
Intellexi
AS
Product
to consul-
tancy
Start to o er consul-
tancy due to low in-
come from their soft-
ware.
Poor finances,
constraint
Consultancy
to TM
They wish to sell
their technology be-
cause of the finan-
cial crisis. All em-
ployees were fired.
Poor
fi-
nances,
con-
straint
CGENE
AS
Product
to consul-
tancy
Produced luminescent
mice. State that
it might be more
valuable for the cus-
tomers to get specially
made mice, rather
than a ”standard”
luminescent mouse.
Market adap-
tion
Consultancy
to TM
Has a patent for a
”luminescent-gene”
in mice. Starts
licensing to other
companies.
Unknown
G-
FLOW
AS
Product
to TM
No customers. Has
patent, is actively
trying to get licensing
deals to get other
to commercialize the
technology
Poor finances
and market
adaption,
constraint
TM to
consul-
tancy
New owner a li-
ated with one of the
founders. Seems
like there is no
market for neither
product nor tech-
nology, with con-
sulting as a survival
strategy.
Poor
fi-
nances,
con-
straint
Optinose
AS
Product
to TM
Equity lost. From
product to developing
technology.
Poor finances,
constraint
Uni Tar-
geting
Research
AS
Product
to TM
Two years after
startup, they changed
to only develop and
sell technology, seem-
ingly due to lack of
financing.
Poor finances,
constraint
15
Advanced
Biopoly-
mers
AS
Product
to TM
Changed to licens-
ing/selling the tech-
nology after the IPR
was secured, seem-
ingly due to lack of
financing.
Poor finances,
constraint
Biosergen
AS
Product
to TM
plan to produce and
sell, then shifts focus
to partnership or li-
censing. Not explic-
itly stated why busi-
ness model is changed,
but the company has
poor finances for many
years.
Poor finances,
constraint
DTECH
AS
Product
to TM
Equity lost and poor fi-
nances forced the com-
pany to dismiss a pro-
duction line in Hun-
gary. The market had
disappeared while the
factory was built.
Poor finances
and market
adaption,
constraint
Nordiag TM to
product
Changed their business
model to sell kits with
test equipment due to
financial constraints
Poor finances,
constraint
Product
to TM
Sold the sample
preparation busi-
ness and returned
to their original
activities of tests
because the sale
did not appear
as profitable as
expected.
Poor
fi-
nances
and
mar-
ket
adap-
tion,
con-
straint
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Table 7: Identified drivers leading to activity
change in sample.
Activity
based change
Financial
con-
straint
Financial
enabler
Unknown
/ other
Consultancy to
TM
1 1
Consultancy to
product
1
Product to con-
sultancy
2 2
Product to TM 7
TM to product 1
TM to consul-
tancy
1
To present and discuss the qualitative results
we will first have a look at the change from con-
sultancy to product oriented business model, the
so called soft starters, and then go through the
activity changes in the order of table 6.
Consultancy to product, soft starters
The one soft starter we found, Synthetica AS,
represents 1.2% of our sample, and is consider-
ably lower fraction than studies like Heirman and
Clarysse (2004) and Helm and Mauroner (2011)
with 22% and 24% respectively. Heirman and
Clarysse (2004) conducted a qualitative analysis
of 99 Belgian RBSOs, and report that 22 of them
are soft starters. Notably, they use a slightly dif-
ferent definition of RBSOs, and also include corpo-
rate spin-o s and individual start-ups in the study.
Only 24 of the companies in their study are aca-
demic spin-o s. Helm and Mauroner (2011) stud-
ied 153 RBSOs from non academic German pub-
lic research organizations, and identified 36 soft
starters. Their definition of RBSOs is closer to the
one we have used in our study, except that they
exclude academic spin-o s which are represented
greatly in our sample.
Synthetica AS was started in 2000 and initially
o ered custom organic synthesis and medicinal
chemistry services, including developing chemi-
cal/molecular compounds. This is contract re-
search which fall into the consulting category. In
2004, they started producing and selling vitamin
standards, as the only global supplier of these
standards. Thus, they changed to a product ori-
ented model. However, Synthetica continued its
contract research while setting up the produc-
tion. Furthermore, in 2006 the research on vi-
tamin standards was spun out in the subsidiary
Syntavit AS.
Synthetica started out as a research boutique
where the academic founders could perform simi-
lar activities as in their academic work. Accord-
ing to Druilhe and Garnsey (2004) this is the
most accessible market opportunity for academic
founders. We found no clarification in our data
whether the founders behind Synthetica had am-
bitions to develop a product company from the
start, or if they only reacted on an emergent mar-
ket opportunity. The fact that Synthetica pre-
served their consulting services may imply the lat-
ter. In addition, Synthetica had positive results
every year since startup. This can be character-
ized as a financial enabler. Their intentions can be
di cult to determine without an interview with
the founders, as their business model contains ele-
ments from di erent activity based business mod-
els. This is a good example showing that activity
based business models as a typology are easy to
separate in theoretical discussions, but challenging
when used as a tool for empirical analysis.
There might be several reasons for why our
results show very few soft starters and di er
from other studies. Heirman and Clarysse (2004)
showed that the academic RBSOs in their sample
were inclined to have a VC-backed starting con-
figuration3 and the transitional start-up category
was mainly made up of independent start-ups.
The academic spin-o s in their sample was un-
derrepresented among soft starters. As such, our
results is consistent with these findings. Hence it
seems like the fraction of transitional start-ups are
prominently smaller for RBSOs than other new
ventures. The explanation provided from Heirman
and Clarysse (2004) is that academic spin-o s gen-
erally attract more venture capital than indepen-
dent firms because of their proprietary technology.
3Heirman and Clarysse (2004) use the categorization
VC-backed start-ups, Prospectors, Product start-ups and
Transitional start-ups.
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Change from product orientation to consul-
tancy or TM
Poor financial situation is the common denomi-
nator for the companies changing from a product
oriented business model. It seems like a change
to consultancy is a strategic choice made merely
to survive, while a change to TM generally can be
seen as a way to recover costs. The latter argu-
ment might not apply to Biosergen AS and other
biotech companies that are in an industry with a
strong appropriability regime. Market adaption
is also an identified driver in some of the cases.
The general impression is that the RBSO has a
poor product to market fit which leads to a poor
financial situation.
Changes between TM and consultancy
It is notable that change between TM and con-
sultancy only occur as a firmÕs second change.
Intellexi AS changes from product orientation to
consultancy due to financial constraints and the
second change is from consultancy to TM, also
due to financial constraints. They were struck by
the financial crisis in 2009 and could not a ord to
have any employees and thus consulting was no
longer an option. The last resort was to sell o 
the technology, and seems like a rather desperate
move. This is also reflected in the fact that In-
tellexi was discontinued in 2011.
G-Flow AS changed from product orientation to
TM as they were running out of money in pursuit
of customers. The plan was to get another com-
mercial actor to commercialize their technology.
The second change was from TM to consultancy,
and it seems like one of the founders took over
the company as a personal consulting firm as the
plan of licensing did not succeed. This is a typical
”consult or die”-situation we also noted in some
of the product to consultancy change companies.
Cgene AS stands out from the other compa-
nies in that neither financial constraints nor en-
ablers are drivers for their business model changes.
They state market demand as a driver for the first
change from product to consultancy. The driver
for their second change from consultancy to TM
is not stated. However, it seems like the consul-
tancy part is continued past the second change,
and Cgene thus have elements of di erent activi-
ties in their business model.
Cognitive vs. real
Vohora et al. (2004) states that the foundersÕ
perception of what business to create is an im-
portant aspect of the threshold of entrepreneurial
commitment. The initial business model of each of
the companies in our sample are determined from
what the board of directors and the CEO artic-
ulate in their annual report. In that regard, the
initial business model in our sample can be viewed
as a cognitive business model in the minds of the
founders that may, or may not, be operational.
We argue that some of the founders communicate
their cognitive perception of the firms future busi-
ness model, but generates income through consul-
tancy activity or TM. This implies that they in
reality act like a consultancy company, and de-
velop a product on the side, like a soft starter.
We propose that this ”cognitive vs. real” business
model misalignment results in an under-reporting
of business model changes, and that some prod-
uct companies that is recorded without change in
business model is in fact is a soft starter, as an
example.
5.3 Financial situation (H2)
H2: Changes in business model are dependent on
financial situation
Table 8: Bivariate cross tabulation between
change or no change in business model and finan-
cial situation same year. Numbers are each year
of operation of the 84 RBSOs.
Satisfactory
financial
situation
same year
Not satisfactory
financial situa-
tion same year
Change of
business
model
23 19
No change
of business
model
462 251
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Table 9: Bivariate cross tabulation between
change or no change in business model and finan-
cial situation same year and year before. Numbers
are each year of operation of the 84 RBSOs.
Satisfactory
financial situ-
ation*
Not satisfac-
tory financial
situation*
Change of busi-
ness model
15 27
No change of
business model
361 268
*Financial status in two subsequent years.
Table 10: Results from chi-square tests of business
model change on the two independent variables of
H2 respectively.
N df Chi2 p-
value
Test 1* 755 1 1.739 0.187
Test 2** 671 1 7.51 0.006
*business model change and financial situation same year.
** business model change and financial situation same year
or year before.
The results from both chi-square tests of H2
are presented in table 10. Bivariate cross tabu-
lations between the dependent variable business
model change and the two independent variables
are presented in table 8 and 9 respectively. The
result of the first chi-square test shows that there
are not significantly more business model changes
occurring the same year as poor financial situation
(p = 18.7%). However, the second test suggest
that H0 can be rejected as the p-value is 0.6%.
Thus, there are significantly more business model
changes that occur when insu cient financial cap-
ital has been reported two subsequent years, prior
and including the year of change.
Although the p-value of the first test was not
significant, its value of 18.7% still indicates that
there may be a connection between poor finan-
cial situation and change in business model. This
is further confirmed by the significant p-value of
the second test. Hence, business model change
seems to be a ected by financial situation as pro-
posed by Skarbø et al. (2014). However, insu -
cient capital a ects change of business model more
strongly than satisfactory financial status. As a
consequence, RBSOs may be more likely to change
their business model because they have to, rather
than because they can. This is consistent with the
qualitative analysis of H1b, where most changes
in activity types were found to be constrained by
poor financial situation.
The changes in business model in our sample
seem to depend more on the financial situation
over time rather than the same year as the change.
This may confirm that changing business model is
a result of a process that might last more than a
year rather than a discrete event that occurs as a
response of an immediate situation. Furthermore,
by being more likely to change business model af-
ter two subsequent years of insu cient finances
than one year, it is likely that the RBSOs post-
pone the required change until absolutely neces-
sary. This is supported by the findings of H1b,
where for example Intellexi AS changed business
model seemingly as a last resort move.
Vohora et al. (2004) describes how RBSOs
need to overcome critical junctures and stages
to achieve sustainable returns, but every critical
juncture may require a change in the resource
base. If there are not enough financial resources
available, the firm is forced to provide the re-
sources in other ways, or change to a more suitable
business model to their resource base. Hence an
explanation of why the RBSOs are more likely to
change business model when they are forced to be-
cause of insu cient financial capital may be that
they are trying to cross a critical juncture. The
most relevant critical juncture for the RBSOs in
our sample is the threshold of sustainable returns,
as they have already entered the re-orienting phase
when establishing the company and initial organi-
zation.
The test of H2 did not separate activity and
element changes as the hypothesis was based on
business model changes in general. However, there
may be di erences between these two perspectives
on business model. As previously mentioned, ac-
tivity transitions imply a change in several ele-
ments simultaneously, while an element change
may only involve a change in one element. Hence
an activity change should be viewed as a larger
reorganization of the resource base rather than an
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element change. The analysis of H1b revealed that
most activity changes were conducted while being
constrained by insu cient financial capital. The
15 changes made after two years of su cient fi-
nances in our sample may be RBSOs refining their
business model towards sustainable returns as de-
scribed by Vohora et al. (2004). This refinement
is likely to involve element changes as a way of op-
timizing the present activity type. Hence element
changes may be more likely when the company has
su cient access to financial capital, which may be
an interesting topic for further research.
5.4 E ect of business model change on
survival rate (H3)
H3: RBSOs that change their business model are
less likely to be discontinued.
Whether or not a change of business model
a ects the likelihood of the RBSO being discon-
tinued, was tested using binary logistic regression.
The correlation matrix of the variables used in
the regression is presented in table 11 and the
result is presented in table 12.
The logistic regression resulted in a p-value of
0.072, hence H0 can be rejected at a 10% signif-
icance level. Thus, H3 is supported and the test
shows that companies that change their business
model in our sample are less likely to be discon-
tinued than others. The odds ratio value of 0.137
indicates that the companies that are not discon-
tinued are over 7 times more likely to have changed
business model at least once.
The correlations between the variables are
shown in table 11. The negative correlation be-
tween software and biotech is expected as they are
mutually exclusive. As the correlation between
software and biotech is stronger than the corre-
lation between each of these variables and the
dependent variable discontinued, this may cause
multicollinearity problems. To test the impact of
these correlations, we calculated the variance in-
flation factors (VIF) for the regression. The max-
imum score of the VIF test was 1.39, hence below
the commonly accepted threshold of 10. Thus we
can neglect the existence of multicollinearity prob-
lems (Freund et al., 2006). The fit between the ob-
servations and the regression model was found to
increase when introducing the control variables,
Table 12: Logistic regression for likelihood of be-
ing discontinued, controlling for age, software and
biotech.
Std.
error
p-
value
Odds
ratio
Business model
change
1.107 0.072 0.137
Age 0.122 0.008 0.723
Software 0.65 0.823 1.156
Biotech 0.743 0.219 2.491
as both the Cox & Snell R2 and Nagelkerke R2
values increased by 0.092 and 0.139 respectively
when including age, software and biotech in the
regression.
As shown in table 12, age is more significantly
contributing to explain the variable discontinued
than business model change. However, this is ex-
pected as most of the RBSOs in our sample were
founded between 2000 and 2003. Hence, those
that have failed will have a lower age than oth-
ers because non discontinued firms still operate in
2012. Software and biotech do not significantly
contribute to failure (p = 0.823 and 0.219 re-
spectively), but biotech seems to be contributing
more than software. The odds ratio of biotech is
2.491 compared to 1.156 for software, which fur-
ther supports that biotech firms are characterized
by higher risk.
In light of RBV, our findings are likely to sup-
port the importance of developing dynamic ca-
pabilities. The presence of dynamic capabilities
makes the entrepreneurs capable of adapting to
changes in market conditions and other external
factors by combining resources and capabilities in
new ways. As described by Skarbø et al. (2014),
the choice of business model is a ected by exter-
nal factors as for instance market- and environ-
mental conditions. Hence changing the business
model may be the result of dynamic capabilities,
which further supports that our findings confirms
the positive impact of change.
A possible explanation for why RBSOs that
change business model are less likely to be dis-
continued may be that they have had a choice
between discontinuing their current business or
change to survive. As indicated by the results of
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Table 11: Correlation matrix for the variables used on the logit regression for testing H3.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Discontinued 1
(2) Business model
change
-0.322** 1
(3) Age -0.414** 0.417** 1
(4) Software -0.018 -0.02 0.03 1
(5) Biotech 0.175 0.016 0.184 -0.233* 1
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
H1b and H2, lack of financial capital creates this
”change or die” ultimatum. The company needs
to either close down the business or adapt by mak-
ing changes that solves the problem. This further
supports the importance of dynamic capabilities
and their e ect on survival.
Although Hannan and Freeman (1984) states
that firms undergoing changes are more likely to
be discontinued, our results suggest the opposite.
We propose this may be due to low structural in-
ertia present in the RBSOs in our sample, as they
are young firms, and most often have few employ-
ees. Furthermore, in the analysis of H1b it was
indicated that some of the business models, and
hence changes in business model, are more cogni-
tive than operational. A cognitive change in busi-
ness model may represent a low degree of reorga-
nization, hence supporting that RBSOs are less
a ected by structural inertia.
The results of testing H1a revealed that most
of the activity changes were made from product
to TM or consultancy. This is consistent with
the findings from H2 where business model change
seems to be dependent on poor financial situation.
As TM and consultancy in general are less re-
source demanding than a product model, the RB-
SOs may have been forced to change because of
insu cient financial capital to further pursue the
product model. This is also consistent with the
result that business model change is likely to be a
positive sign in terms of survival, as it may be a
result of a ”change or die” situation. Hence, these
consistencies provides strong arguments for as-
suming that most RBSOs change business model
when they have to rather than when opportunities
arises.
6 Conclusions
The business models of RBSOs have barely been
touched by scholars, but is nevertheless an impor-
tant aspect of RBSOs, as we have shown in this
study. Skarbø et al. (2014) identified and charac-
terized drivers for choice of business models. In
this study we have empirically analyzed one of
these drivers, financial capital, and its e ect on
business model, as well as the e ect of business
model change on survival. This was conducted by
using a mixed method approach.
Through a qualitative analysis of all RBSOs
with changes from one activity based business
model to another, we found that financial capital
is a dominant driver for these transitions. Insuf-
ficient financial capital was found to provoke as
well as constrain the available choices in most ac-
tivity changes. All combinations of activity based
changes were found in the sample, with most tran-
sitions from product to TM or consulting. How-
ever, although regarded as a common transition
by similar studies, only one soft starter was found.
We suggest that this may be the result from a mis-
match between the founders ”cognitive” business
model (what they state in the annual report) and
their operational business model.
The importance of insu cient financial capital
as a driver for choice of business model was fur-
ther supported by our quantitative analysis of the
RBSOs in our sample. Specifically, a change in
business model was found to be significantly more
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Table 13: Summary of results from all hypothesis tests.
Hypothesis Result Comment
H1a: All combinations of activity based
changes exists for RBSOs
Supported Most changes were from product to TM or
consulting
H1b: We expect to find financial drivers
as a constrainer in changes from product
to TM or consultancy, as an enabler from
TM or consultancy to product and both
enabler and constrainer between TM and
consulting.
Not supported Financial drivers as a constrainer in change
from TM to product was not found.
H2: Changes in business model are depen-
dent on financial situation
Supported Supported for change after two years of in-
su cient financial capital.
H3: RBSOs that have changed their busi-
ness model are less likely to be discontin-
ued
Supported RBSOs that change business model were 7
times more likely to survive
likely after a period of poor rather than satisfac-
tory financial situation. Another finding from our
quantitative study is that RBSOs in our sample
that perform a change of their business model has
lower likelihood of being discontinued. This aligns
with what resource based view states as dynamic
capabilities, which will be important for firm per-
formance. We argue that many of the changes
were made because the companies are facing a
crossroad of either change or die operation. Com-
bined with the findings that poor financial situa-
tion greatly influences change, we believe this rep-
resents an indication of RBSOs being more likely
to change their business model because they are
forced to rather than as a response to an oppor-
tunity.
Thus, through the results of testing our hy-
potheses we are able to answer our research ques-
tion: How does financial capital a ect a change
in business model and how does a change in busi-
ness model influence the likelihood of failing for
RBSOs?
The framework for analyzing drivers for choice
of business models proposed in Skarbø et al.
(2014) has shown to be useful for both qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis of business model
changes. This indicates that drivers for choice and
change of business model are valid for analyzing
both decisions. In addition, the categorization of
drivers has shown to be a useful tool for analyzing
how and why RBSOs change their business model.
7 Limitations and further re-
search
Although the historical data available for each
RBSO in our sample is unique in many ways, it
is not without limitations. The amount of infor-
mation provided in the annual report was found
to di er greatly among the firms. Also, the vari-
able of business model change is based on our own
perception (by using the definition of element and
activity change) of what the company articulate
as their business model in the annual report. This
may cause a bias in accuracy of the variables be-
tween each firm.
As it is unknown to us in which extent
the companies reported all changes, we suspect
that smaller element changes were not identified.
These changes may not be viewed by the firm as
relevant for the annual report, but still be relevant
for our research. In addition, the report is written
by the board of directors, which may have a dif-
ferent perception of what activities and business
model elements the firm pursue than what they
do in reality.
The term business model has become a pop-
ular way of describing attributes of firms for
both scholars and practitioners (Zott et al., 2011).
However, there is a great variation in how it is
defined. The generally accepted definition of de-
scribing how a firm creates, captures and delivers
value allows for many di erent perceptions. This
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may a ect the relatedness, and should be kept in
mind when comparing to other studies on business
models.
Although firms that are discontinued undoubt-
edly are failures, the firms that exist but have no
activity (living dead) can also be viewed as fail-
ures. As a result, firms that have changed their
business model but not discontinued may still be
failures in reality. Hence, the living dead phenom-
ena is a highly interesting topic for a qualitatively
study to better assess the e ect of business model
change of failure vs success. How many, what
caused the state, and what activity that was con-
ducted would contribute to better understanding
of the RBSOs evolvement.
Since all companies develop di erently, is rea-
son to believe that the companies have diverse
reasons for changing their business model. 15 of
42 changes in business model were done while the
companies had two subsequent years of su cient
financial situation and a more more comprehen-
sive study of those would probably reveal the un-
derlying cause of change. A further qualitative
study of those RBSOs that has changed their busi-
ness model would give a better perception of the
underlying reasons why companies develop di er-
ently in an emergent environment.
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